这个世界上好像有很多人都在说或者写一些说了等于没有说的话，然后就上报，成了公众明星。反正自己还是喜欢多一些扎实的数据或者研究为好。明年的这个时候，来看看这位榭大师关于美国经济的预言是否正确。至于关于中国的部门，所有人都知道资本在经济危机的时候一定外流，所以这位大师这样子写，总不会错的了。不过，where is the insight?

中国金融业还没有经受过大的市场考验。虽然国有银行已经陆续上市，增加了透明度，对中国金融业的发展作用非常，但还只是第一步。

第一点(原因)在于，中国上一个经济周期降下来，银行坏账是国家出钱来解决的，

所以银行还没有证明自己有能力来处理诸如坏账的问题；第二点在于中国银行业盈利主要靠利差，而利差是国家送的。一旦经济朝下走，很多问题都会出现，如果能力过剩，就会出现坏账，土地价格下降也会出现坏账。

本轮经济周期一直处于发展高位，这个高位体现在中国和印度(经济)增长很快，上一轮经济周期快的是韩国、东南亚，再上一次是日本和中国台湾地区。这(即经济增长快)并不是因为内部体制，特别是金融体制好，而是劳动力成本低所引发。劳动力成本低引起出口大量上升，尤其是货币增长很快，贷款增加也很快，在这种上升情况下，(企业)盈利都很好，看不到大的坏账。

不过，中国跟前一轮经济周期中的东南亚地区和韩国最不一样的地方是外贸顺差很大。经济过热的情况下，中国出现外贸顺差，这是跟其他国家非常不一样的——这主要是因为中国的资产主要是政府拥有，市民收入比较低，消费比较低——在经济增长很快时出现外贸顺差，给控制金融风险带来特别的挑战。中国有32万亿人民币的存款，这么大的存款规模，在金融体系没有完全成熟的情况下是高风险的状态。

我觉得，(全球)经济周期已经朝下走，过去经济周期朝下走都是着陆。中国经济的过热不是典型过热，过热伴随的是资金过剩；但印度过热就是典型过热，通胀很高，外贸逆差大幅上升，和几十年前非常类似。我觉得印度在今后一年到两年出现硬着陆的可能性非常大。不要以为印度出现硬着陆与中国市场无关，其实影响非常大。

中国的外汇储备超过了一万亿美元，看似很有钱，其实这不是中国的钱，是资金流入的结果。其中的30%是2003年以后进来的，超过60%是资本流入，这是长期的资本还是投资的资本，还很难说。最近，我看到很多的直接投资——所谓直接投资基金和私募基金在国内的投资——大部分朝着土地价格和拥有土地潜在价值。中国外汇储备的增加跟投机有关，而投机资本是受情绪影响的，风向一变，大家都会朝同一个方向走，还会带动当地的资本跟他们一起走。东南亚(金融危机)当时就是这样，外资撤出来两千亿，当地的资本也撤出来类似这么多。(所以)一旦印度出现硬着陆，会引起大家心态的变化，引发中国资本外流。

其次，美国借钱花钱的现象总有一天要停。过去12个月，美国外贸逆差8600亿美元，这一外贸逆差相对于发展中国家就是巨大的资金。八千多亿美金从美国流出之后，流入发展中国家就引起这些国家的股市、房地产大幅度上升，利息下降。资金不能停，它们最后又流回美国，买美国的国债，这就是美国借钱花钱。如果美国停止借钱花钱，资金链就断了。

其实，美国在市场上竞争力没那么高，工资已经不涨了，好日子靠借钱撑着，哪一天他理解这一点，就不借钱了。这个会突然发生，什么时候出现了，我们的考验就到了。中国发展得好，部分是美国借钱花钱带来的。中国也是赚别人的钱来支持投资，13亿人靠3亿人撑着不可能。

(美国)市场经济那么好，撑了三年，现在没有朝下走的现象，我觉得再撑一年挺困难，最重要的原因是通胀上升，随后政策要收紧，收紧以后美国消费会下降。在金融管理方面，中国还是应以风险控制为主，在世界经济周期走入尾期，千万不要冒太大的风险。

Since early 2002 the dollar has been on a steep downward path: on JPMorgan's trade-weighted real exchange rate it has depreciated by 23 per cent since February 2002 (see chart). This is the third such sustained decline since Mr Connolly's remarks. The first was during the early 1970s. The second was from 1985 to 1988. On each of the two previous occasions, the depreciating real exchange rate also helped generate a big adjustment in the balance of payments. This was strikingly true in the 1980s. The same thing is happening again.

Between 1995 and 2004 real US domestic demand grew faster than real gross domestic product every year (see chart). This was necessary, I have previously argued, if GDP was to rise in line with potential, given the prevailing real exchange rates and the weak rate of growth of demand in much of the rest of the world. Over these years, cumulative growth in US real demand was 39 per cent, while GDP grew by 33 per cent. The difference was the real increase in the deficit in trade in goods and non-factor services

This has now changed. US real GDP will have grown at almost exactly the same rate as real demand in 2005 and 2006, according to the most recent economic outlook from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. In real terms, the current account deficit is consequently stabilising at last, albeit at a very high level.

US exports are also at last growing at roughly the same rate as imports: between the third quarter of 2003 and the third quarter of this year exports of goods and services grew 27 per cent, in constant prices, while imports rose 26 per cent. This is a big change: over the previous eight years, US exports rose by a mere 31 per cent, while imports rose by 80 per cent, again in constant prices.

Does this suggest that the needed adjustment in the real exchange rate has come to an end? Probably not.

If the current account deficit were to remain close to 7 per cent of GDP, US net liabilities would probably stabilise at substantially more than 100 per cent of GDP. That would be an extraordinarily high level for such a big economy. Moreover, one would expect a rise in net liabilities from about 22 per cent of GDP at the end of last year to force substantial changes in asset prices. The larger the US share in the portfolios of the rest of the world, the higher the prospective returns that foreign investors would be expected to demand, to compensate for the risk.

Either a lower dollar, or lower US asset prices, or both, would seem the inevitable result. Moreover, it is hard to imagine that a falling exchange rate would not be a big part of this picture. The fact that the US borrows entirely in its own currency makes deficits safer for itself, but riskier for its creditors. For this reason a belief that the currency has become undervalued – and so can be expected to appreciate – would make it easier to sustain net liabilities on such a gigantic scale. This is one reason why such movements tend to overshoot.

Moreover, some three-fifths of gross US liabilities of $13,625bn at the end of last year took the form of bonds, currency, bank liabilities and similar claims. The value of such claims to foreign creditors is more vulnerable to inflation and so to the impact on domestic prices of a sizeable currency depreciation than claims on real assets. The US cannot guarantee the dollar against a fall and would not wish to, even if it could. So creditors are likely to come to a point at which they wish to see the depreciation before they continue to supply the capital flows that will be needed.

Creditors will also be more willing to go on buying US assets if they start to see a reduction in the country's deficits. That would require a period during which exports grew faster than imports, in real terms. It is at least plausible that this would also necessitate a lower real exchange rate than we have ever seen before.

Thus, even though the currency has fallen a long way, it is easy to imagine its falling more. How far it would need to fall would depend on how quickly demand grew in the rest of the world. It would also depend on what happened in the US economy itself: the weaker domestic demand and the lower the interest rate, the lower the dollar itself might go.

In short, the long bear market in the dollar is probably not over. But even if it were over, on a trade-weighted basis, that would not be the end of the story. An overall decline is only a part of what is required. Also important is some redistribution of the adjustment.

Hitherto, high-income countries that are not running large current account surpluses have experienced big appreciations against the dollar, while the developing countries that are running such surpluses have not (see charts). That is unlikely to be sustainable, not least because it has required colossal exchange rate intervention. Official reserves exceeded $4,500bn by the end of the first half of 2006, an increase of some $2,700bn since the end of 1999.

It is possible to imagine a world in which a substantial part of the US current account deficit were shifted to other high-income countries by a depreciation of the currencies of the entire extended dollar area. But it is hard to imagine the countries with floating exchange rates tolerating such a shift for long. The eurozone is a particularly unlikely candidate.

Where then have we arrived in the story? First, adjustment is beginning to happen, as the dollar has plunged substantially on a trade-weighted basis, while demand in the rest of the world has also picked up; second, the decline in the dollar has probably not reached the level needed to sustain either a big diminution of the external deficit or the needed financing; third, even if it has, the necessary adjustment of exchange rates between the countries in the extended dollar area and countries with floating exchange rates has still hardly begun.

This extended saga will finish with many chapters: the rise of the dollar while the US current account deficit exploded was the first; the fall of the dollar while the current account deficit went on rising was the second; we are now in the third, when the deficit stabilises at last. But this story is not yet over. What sort of problem the dollar will prove to be over the entire cycle is unclear. All we can say at the moment is: “So far, not too bad”. Let us hope it remains so.