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12/31/2008 “变”字当选日本2008年度汉字（图）
Quantitative easingQuantitative easing from Marketplace on Vimeo. 帅哥说：Quantitative easing=2件事，第一，购买银行的有毒资产，第二，购买国库券，以便使得按揭钉住的长期利率保持低水平。 联储在降低利率在0-0.25%以后，声明说除了降息工具以外，还可以有许多工具包括这个quantitative easing来保证金融市场的稳定，促进银行向个人和企业进行借贷，于是大家都在预测到底联储会在0利率的水平下如何动作。截至到12月15里，美国的M1增速是10.7%，M2是7.7%。什么意思呢？就是说今年美国GDP增长2%，CPI可能是2%，加起来是4%，但是M1也就是说currency in circulation比4%还要翻一倍多还不止,这多的5.7%部分不会去买房子和股票，只能买国库券，当然等几个月大家不再那么恐慌，10年期的国库券也只有2.5%左右的收益无法再吸引这多余的5.7%的货币，那个时候恐怕就是股市能踹口气的时候。说白话一点，就是要等到high-yield corporate bond spread真正有下降的明显趋势，就是可以买点股票的时候了。要知道往常联储对M2的增速规定最高不能超过5%。啥叫不顾一切地救市，这个就算一个。其实，最近金融市场的一些关键指标没有恶化，包括： 1.Ted rate在不断的收窄。The TED spread, a gauge of banks’ willingness to lend, slipped below 150 basis points for the first time since before the collapse of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. amid speculation U.S. borrowing costs near zero and promises of further government cash will help unfreeze credit. source: http://www.crossingwallstreet.com/archives/2008/12/ted_spreads_nar.html 2.High-yield bond, investment-grade bond, pref.stocks都在企稳 当然还要看如何度过option ARM这一关，是否会导致地区商业银行的大量破产和破产、失业率的进一步高企。 Marc Faber's Interview on CNBCCNBC连Marc Faber也没有听说过，哎，看看Bloomberg就知道人家多专业，基本上非常敬仰的态度来采访Marc，起码Marc每次采访都带来自己独立的思考结果，而且敢给观众确实的观点，比如这次他就不相信大行的观点，认为油价如果跌倒25，我们基本上都可以歇菜了。他认为日本股市已经跌倒了1990的水平，比美国算起来是相对的便宜了。现在到处都是日本大萧条的新闻：Japan's economy will probably shrink at an annual 12.1 percent pace this quarter, the sharpest drop since 1974, as exports collapse, Barclays Capital said. 12/30/2008 Real Econ hits1.Silicon Valley Braces for Firings as Technology Outlook Worsens 2.联想1月中旬或公布重组方案 杨元庆或自责请辞
12/29/2008 2009年投资展望2008 年是金融市场剧烈动荡的一年，2007 年在美国爆发的次贷危机演变成了几十年不遇的金融危机，并且最终对全球实体经济形成巨大冲击。作为正在崛起的大国，中国也未能幸免，经济减速已不可避免，上证综指已经从 2007 年的最高点跌去了 70%。然而，最糟糕的时期是否已经过去？2009 年对投资者有哪些机会，又有哪些挑战？在目前极具不确定性的时点，五位来自不同领域的勇敢“预言家”——他们分别是：普信集团副总裁林羿，渣打银行（中国）有限公司中国研究部主管王志浩（Stephen Green），独立经济学家、玫瑰石顾问公司董事谢国忠，博时基金管理有限公司混合组投资总监杨锐和广发基金管理有限公司副总经理朱平——就全球经济、中国经济及股市、汇市及其他特殊的投资机会表达了自己的真知灼见。 美国及全球经济 问：请谈谈对美国 7,000 亿的救市计划和美国金融危机的看法？将会如何发展？ 普信集团副总裁、大中华区董事林羿博士：这个计划是美国国会授权美国政府通过向全球─主要是向美国发行国债的方式来集资 7,000 亿美元，以拯救美国的金融系统，计划包括授权美国行政部门（财政部、央行）购买金融机构的按揭支持证券，其中相当一部分是坏账。然而，购买这些不良资产，政府要跟金融机构谈判，需要花时间，但市场等不及了，所以美国政府不得不采取计划。授权的另一措施，就是所谓的“瑞典模式”。瑞典上世纪 90 年代也发生了类似的金融危机，解决方式就是国家发行国债，然后将这笔钱直接注入银行，买银行的股票，等於是将银行国有化。因此，美国政府就将 7,000 亿中的 2,500 亿投资於十家大银行，购买其优先股。美国是坚信自由资本主义的国家，这种购买优先股还不是直接将银行国有化，优先股具有优先红利权，但没有投票权。可是，政府购买优先股有个前提条件，就是对参股的银行的高管报酬要有决定权。不然，像雷曼公司都破产了，它的 CEO 还得到了 3,700 万的年收入，民众这方面的愤怒呼声很高。修改后的计划起到了一定的稳定市场作用。首先，冻结了两个星期的信贷市场开始松动，美国通用汽车贷款的利息开始下降，说明银行愿意给通用汽车贷款了。其次，反映企业借贷的商业票据市场最近（10 月 29 日为止）也增长至 1,010 亿美元。总之，此次危机对美国金融业乃至经济都会有深远的影响，我们觉得这个庞大的救市计划还是会奏效的，凯恩斯理论将会被再次证明是正确的。但它需要时间，我们最乐观的估计是，在 2009 年下半年美国经济会稳定下来，在此之前可能会进一步“减缓”。我不愿意用“恶化”这个词，因为据我们的数据显示，欧洲和日本已经进入衰退，从定义的角度看，美国还没有进入衰退，因为还没有出现连续两个季度的负增长，尽管三季度增长率是－0.3%，但前两个季度增长率还是正的，二季度甚至达到了 2.8%。但是我们觉得，美国从四季度到明年二季度经济会出现衰退。如果一切顺利，那么2009 年下半年我们估计可以看到美国经济复苏的迹象。保守一点的话，2009 年全年都可能会是负增长，到 2010 年才会开始复苏。 问：此次美国金融危机最坏的时期是否已经过去？ 渣打银行（中国）有限公司中国研究部主管王志浩（Stephen Green）博士：肯定还没有过去。情况比较复杂，如果看银行间的市场─银行愿不愿意借钱给别的银行，可能最坏的时期已经过去了，银行的同业拆借利率仍然非常高，但已经开始下跌。金融危机还需要三到六个月的时间才会过去（采访时间为 10 月底），因为有一些对冲基金和 PE 将来还会大规模地倒闭，美国还会有100 或者 200 多家小型银行会倒闭。美联储已经向一些大规模的银行注资，但还有很多城市和地区性的银行会出问题。全球经济已经进入了传统的衰退时期，可能需要一年到一年半才能看到复苏。我们估计明年美国的增长是－3%，欧洲估计增长率为零。我们美国的经济学家认为美国的此次衰退是“V 型”的，2010 年就会出现反弹，经济增长率会达到 2.5% 到 3%。但是，2010 年对美国人而言感觉还会比较艰难，因为增长因素可能大部分来自出口，而不是消费，消费可能需要两三年才能恢复。 独立经济学家、玫瑰石顾问公司董事谢国忠：美国经济步入衰退没有问题，但这一次跟以往不大一样的是，过去历史上的衰退一般是 0.3% 或 0.4%，这次是十倍於之前的规模了，会达到 3% 到 5% 的衰退。明年美国经济是负增长，2010 年会稳定下来，但要恢复到之前的增长速度则是很多年之后的事了，这次衰退是 L 型的。 问：日本上世纪 80 年代末发生了经济衰退，不久经济就恢复了正增长，增长率一直非常低。但日本股市 20 多年都没有回到之前的高点。 谢国忠：这是正常的，没有什么特殊。美国大熊市来了之后，往往也要 10 到 20 年才能达到上一个牛市的高点。美国股市的最高点是 2000 年的时候，标准普尔指数达到了 1,800 多点，2007 年的牛市达到了 1,500 多点，这并不是一个独立的牛市。如果假设 15 年才能回到上一轮的高点的话，那么标准普尔指数要到 2015 年才能达到 1,700 到 1,800 点。 问：美国经济会不会从此一蹶不振？ 谢国忠：美国还没有到一蹶不振的地步，只是这 20 年借债借得太多了，即借钱消费过度了，需要消化一下。美国最基本的三个竞争优势─科技、资源和军事─这三个实体优势还在，因此只是需要调整、消化。 林羿：美国不会从此一蹶不振，但是会受到重创。美国现在的情况类似於二战后英国的情况。二战后，虽然在军事上英国取得了对德国的胜利，但其金融体系受到致命的打击。我虽然不认为美国从此会一蹶不振，但美国作为金融帝国独霸世界金融体系的日子应该是一去不复返了。
中国经济 问：此次金融危机导致外部需求下降，对中国经济影响也很大。对中国经济 2009 年的走势，有什么看法？ 博时基金管理有限公司混合组投资总监杨锐博士：我的理解，宏观经济就是两个东西：短期波动和长期增长。2008 年之后的几年，中国经济的格局是结构性的转变碰到了短期经济周期的变化。事实上，短期的小的经济周期是很正常的，现在的问题是在经济小周期向下的比较困难的时期，又遇到了决定中国长期增长的关键问题，也就是产业结构的变化。过去 30 年，中国是以出口为引擎的增长模式，目前，外部需求下降带来了很大的问题，因此在这个时点上，外部需求的变化倒逼了中国讨论多年的经济结构转型。很显然，未来转型的方向也就是今后几年的投资主题：一是内需，二是创新。当然，知易行难，理论界就产业结构升级转型也讨论了很长时间，但以依我看，还需要有重大的事情发生，以此为契机才能推动。讨论这么多年，没有什么实质的进展。为什么呢？因为在原来出口导向的模式下，各方面还很舒服，所以全国的资源都会继续配置在这些产业上。从投资主题到投资组合构建，基金经理常会遇到一个难题，即：即使你有好的主题，也找不到好的投资标的。更何况，找到一个好的、经得起历史检验的主题，也并不容易。举个例子吧：创新分为几个层面，第一是真正意义上的重大创新─10 到 20 年才碰到一次。比如，1995 年的网景上市到 1999 年的网络股热潮，虽然后来网络泡沫破裂了，但现在回头看，它所导致的计算机普及和宽带出现，其实对生产方式产生了很大的影响。这种重大的创新，在国内我们还没有碰到过，有几个稍微好一点的标的是在海外上市的。我们在国内碰到比较多的是改进，比如钢铁各项指标的提高。 我更愿意与大家分享长期的趋势变化。首先，从实体经济来看，第一是气候变化，这会影响政府、企业和消费者的行为，比如美国 2005 年后出现的飓风，中国南方今年罕见的雪灾。第二是人口结构的变化，即老龄化，这主要是发生在美国等发达国家，美国二战后婴儿潮出生的人现在开始退休。发展中国家也快进入这个阶段了。第三是食品安全，这是发展中国家发展到一定阶段遇到的问题。第四是地缘政治。1929 到 1933 年美国遇到了经济大萧条，紧接就发生了二战（1939 年至 1945 年），这表明经济的混乱会使得政治家利用战争转移注意力，当然目前并没有这么紧张，也可能是以全球共同合作而不是竞争的方式出现。其次，从货币面来看，金融体系存在重大的问题。格林斯潘说是百年未遇的危机，索罗斯说是 60 年未遇。倒推回去 60 年，是 1948 年，正是二战后金融体系建立的时间，所以索罗斯的意思是说，二战后的金融体系彻底崩溃了。在布雷顿森林体系中，美元是与黄金挂钩的，还是金本位，但 20 世纪 70 年代石油危机之后，美元与黄金脱钩，在此之后，实际上通货膨胀成为常态了。金本位的意思是你有多少黄金（货币准备），就只能做多大的事情，因此可以使金融市场离实质面不会太远。第二个货币面的问题是金融机构发生了变化，对中国的意义在於老师出了问题，目标没有了。美国的去杠杆化可能会使其经济倒退 10 年，中国目前风险还不大，原因在於中国还没有发展到美国这个阶段，中国的金融创新情况是不足，不像美国已经过度。美国金融机构出问题在於贪婪，即传统的投资银行用自己的资产负债表去冒险，以获取高额的回报。这种人性，在政府宽松的监管下，真是如鱼得水。 广发基金管理有限公司副总经理朱平：现在对中国 2009 年的经济作出判断，相对困难一些，原因在於： 第一，全球经济的动荡是由次贷危机引起的，然后是金融危机，接下来会不会有经济危机？而经济危机后面会不会有政治危机？2002 年以后，全球经济增长显着增速，2006 年、2007 年增长率都超过 4%，这比过去 20 年全球的平均增长率高 1.5 个百分点以上。现在大家都在反思，认为过去这个增长有合理的部分，也有需要修正的部分。简单讲，全球经济有一个三角基石，就是以美国为代表的发达国家、以中国为代表的新兴国家和资本市场。美国人的消费更多地建立在他们从资本市场上所获得的收益，中国给他们提供消费品，这形成了一个非常好的循环。而次贷危机将资本市场的泡沫刺破之后，整个循环就形成了一个逆转。2005 年我们就讨论过美国的“双赤字”（指美国财政赤字和经常账户赤字同时存在的现象）是不是可以持续。2007 年大家慢慢就谈忘了，因为美国的“双赤字”还在持续，但现在看，这种非均衡是无法持续的。 第二，未来的发展必须在均衡的前提下，因此各国都需要调整，像美国不能再有“双赤字”了。消费也要调整，其他发达经济体也要进行调整。而中国的调整其实开始得比较早，因为有日本的前车之鉴，我们从 2004 年就开始对房地产进行调整，虽然房价还是涨得比较高，但如果没有政府提前的调整，可能会涨得更高，明年我们的调整可能不会减少，只会增加。 第三，中国保增长能保到什么程度？2009 年中国经济增长率肯定比今年还要低，因为我们面对的外部环境比今年要差。当然，明年也有比今年好的地方，那就是对未来的预期可能会比今年好一些。分得再细一点，第一个就是出口，我们到底对国外的出口依赖程度有多大？国外的需求萎缩到底有多严重？第二是消费，最近中国的消费股是在下跌的，有人说是补跌，但我们回头看 2004、2005 年的时候，大市非常不好，但消费股表现还是不错。那时也有人预期消费会下来，但那一次熊市没有体现出来，还是一路增长。这一次与 2004、2005 年会不会有所不同呢？在经济增长放缓之后，消费是不是也会确确实实地下滑。目前，消费下滑还只是有个苗头，但明年答案就会出来。第三个是投资，大家都知道投资是经济增长的支柱，困难也很明确，我们的私人投资占了 70%，这些投资多数都是投在制造业和房地产。明年制造业的投资不乐观，而房地产关键是量，虽然价格下跌幅度不小，但与成交量相比还是不多。相信政府明年在控制房价的同时还是会想办法提高成交量，一个大家都不买房的市场肯定不是健康的房地产市场。总之，虽然三方面都有困难，但我个人还没有说这就是世界末日，我觉得明年 GDP 增长 8% 以上还是有的。如果中国 GDP 增长低於 8%，那意味中国有大量的产能过剩，对中国经济打击还是非常大的。 王志浩：我们正要调整对中国明年 GDP 的预测。本来我们预测是增长 7.9%，现在调整到 7.5%。我们对明年的出口非常悲观，认为明年中国实际的出口会出现衰退，对中国企业冲击非常大。我们的数据是中国制造企业的五个工厂中就有两个是为出口生产，三个是为国内生产。除了外需下降以外，中国的房地产市场可能也需要六个月才能恢复，但恢复的前提是住宅价格下跌 20%到 30%，这样才会引起比较大的需求，目前价格还太高。国内的钢铁、水泥甚至消费都会受房地产低迷的影响。因此，中国的问题是外部需求下降的同时，内部需求也在下降。因此我们认为明年中国经济增长 7.5%，2010 年大概 7.7%。 2010 年美国经济有所恢复，所以出口看到希望，那时中国的房地产市场也慢慢变得健康。 问：这次始於美国的金融危机对中国将会产生哪些影响？ 杨锐：最直接的影响是对出口的公司盈利有比较大的负面影响，对其他公司的影响更多的还是来源於国内自己经济周期的影响，最重要的还是结构调整。但是，要特别注意的是，表面上来看这次美国的金融危机是对出口影响比较大，因为出口的是最终产品，但对上中游行业都会有一系列的影响，比如对钢铁、水泥、能源、煤炭，都会产生一定的影响。原因很简单，中国的这些原材料，通过出口的商品，被全球消耗了。 对中国短期宏观经济的判断比较难，原因是噪音很多。好比盲人摸象，这个人摸到了鼻子说自己摸到了真理，那个摸到了尾巴也说自己摸到了真理。我认为宏观经济增长的来源，产业转型是个长期的过程。第一，对过去 30 年经济增长方式的转变，肯定是要以10 年、20 年来看；第二，中国人口结构和人口素质也在发生很大的改变。现在受教育的劳动力和以前有很大不同；第三，中国的现代化、城市化和工业化也需要一个过程。我个人判断中国经济增长可能会减速，但绝对不会出现硬陆，即大幅下降的情况。原因在於，（1）我认为中国政府是个负责任的政府，外部世界越乱，中国政府越想把内部的事做好，现在这一点也可以看得很清楚了。（2）做好自己的事的动力没有问题，那么有没有这个能力呢？中国有这个能力。我们看中国的 GDP，广东和浙江在下降，中部地区下降不明显，而西部地区还远远高於平均值。我们的确看到长三角和珠三角的出口遇到了问题，但中部还在工业化和现代化的过程中，西部的工业化、现代化才刚刚开始。（3）中国的税收政策还有很大的调整空间。（4）中国的基础设施建设还有很长的路要走。事实上，2005 年我和麦基尔（《漫步华尔街》一书作者）合写过一本书─《从华尔街到长城》，讨论了中国长期增长的 8 个重要问题，现在来看，更清楚了。 朱平：首先，直接的影响是出口增长不可能像原来一样快。这其实是短期不好，长期利好。像中国这么大的经济体，如果想从人均 3,000 美元或者 5,000 美元进一步向前发展，没有内需是不可能的。中国是此次金融危机的参与者之一，但中国受到的损失是比较小的，中国出口了大量产品，留下了现金。其次，大宗商品的价格可能会缓解，这也是对中国有利的事，因为中国是大宗商品的净进口国。而且我认为，中国政府也会考虑减轻投资在 GDP 中所占的比重，这会使 GDP 下降，也许五年以后，中国 GDP 增长只有 7%，但每个人可能比以前有更多的实惠，这不是一件更好的事吗？因为我们的成本更低了，我们更多的钱投在劳动力上面，我们可能更多地发展了服务业和消费业这种资产比较轻的行业，使老百姓的生活水平提高了，只是没有体现在 GDP 上。这也是一个循环，我个人觉得，较之前的高投资、高商品价格、高出口，这个循环可能对中国更有利一点。第三个影响都是促进中国经济尽快转型。 总体而言，除了短期的冲击之外，都是好事。这就像亚洲金融危机一样。 问：中国经济在目前的情况下被迫由外向型向内需型转型，这个转型需要多长时间？ 谢国忠：目前，中国的经济转型还只是概念，没有什么具体措施。中国经济转型最大的问题就是家庭收入过低，收入过度集中在政府和少部分人手里，因此虽然人多，但消费却上不来。有钱的人就是在政府带头的情况下搞投资的。 问：你觉得这个趋势能发生改变吗？比如今年年初政府颁布实施了新《劳动法》，以加强劳动者的保护。 谢国忠：目前工资收入增长还是比较快的，刚开始倾向於提高家庭收入，但中国是个很低的基数，中国的家庭或者劳动力收入占 GDP 40% 的比例都不到，这在全世界都是最低的。因此在目前这个情况下谈内需、谈消费，都是概念。 问：你认为政府可以使得家庭收入在未来不断提高吗？ 谢国忠：中国的政府必须进行很大的调整才行，因为地方政府都是想收钱。如果政府都是想收钱的政府，那么老百姓的收入很难有竞争力。中国的权力都集中在政府手里，没有平衡，政府的力量高於市场的力量，因此政府收钱是挡不住的。因此，最终的核心问题是中国政府如何看待自己的角色的问题。政府现在最重要的是要管住自己，不要拿走太多的钱。内需最终还是要靠提高家庭收入，而不是概念。 问：就你所见，政府是否有一些刺激内需的政策呢？ 谢国忠：目前还是政府出钱搞投资，跟原来没有什么区别。政府的政策有周期性的（指中国经济目前面临自身周期性的减速），也有结构性的。目前结构性的政策还没有大量看到，有一个是最近提出来的─农村土地的流转，这只是走出的第一步吧。中国类似的问题还是很多的。比如，政府在收税收费上面要进行限制。政府的目标是要收多少钱？收上来的钱怎么用？这些是政策改革必须做的。政府要理顺政府与民间的关系，像牌照、准入，很多时候都是人为地创造短缺，民营企业为了取得这些资源，就围官员转。 问：有人提出，政府可以将国有企业赚来的利润让利给老百姓，你认为有没有这种可能？ 谢国忠：为了刺激经济，还是有这种可能的。最根本的是，政府通过什么手段达到这个目的。目前看，还是不清楚的，权力都在政府手里，但有了这些权力要做什么，事先都没有说明白，随时可以变。 问：对人民币汇率有何看法？人民币有可能借此次金融危机的机会成为国际货币吗？ 王志浩：我们基本上认为人民币对美元会保持稳定，1 美元兑 6.7~6.8 元人民币的汇率一直要保持到明年年底。2010 年以后，人民币可能会继续升值，因为那时出口会慢慢恢复。而 2009 年中国还会有一个比较大的贸易顺差，即使出口下降了，但同时进口也下降了。因为有贸易顺差，我们认为人民币还算是被低估的。 但从另一个角度看，我们比较关心人民币对一篮子货币的情况。如果用一篮子货币来计算人民币的有效汇率，因为最近美元很强，所以其实人民币现在达到了 1989 年以来最强的水平，也即人民币现在是 20 年来最贵的时候，这会影响到中国的进出口。你也注意到，除了日元、人民币以外，大部分亚洲货币对美元都贬值了。有一种观点是，在目前金融市场剧烈动荡的时候，中国政府希望人民币要起到稳定的作用，我们也很同意这种观点。 而人民币可自由兑换则是一件长期的事，或许 5 年、10 年，短期可能性不大，因为中国经济会进入不景气的时期，很有可能银行的贷款会下降，坏账也会出来，我们认为热钱已经开始流走，资产价格可能下跌，至少资产价格不会再上升，消费信心也会比较弱。这种情况下，中国肯定不会打开资本账户，否则更多的资本会流走。中国宏观经济稳定下来，需要两年的时间，那时中央可能才会再考虑人民币自由兑换的事情。
关於股市及投资策略 问：对明年中国证券市场有何看法？最坏的时间已经过去了吗？ 谢国忠：目前是有金融恐惧症，可能会迎来反弹，但还不是完全转好了，原因是世界经济还需要大幅下滑，盈利还没有降到最低点。2009 年上半年才会是证券市场的最低谷。 杨锐：病去如抽丝。当你回头看的时候，你才知道你现在是在最低点还是在半山腰。我们基金（杨博士管理的博时平衡配置混合型证券投资基金是今年表现最出色的公蓦开放式基金之一─编者注）今年表现不错，重要原因就是大局观。我很奇怪，很多人一遇市场下跌，就说更要从下到上选个好股。从我们上面的分析中，看得很清楚了：在结构剧变的时候，宏观的视角、长期的观点有多重要！对做投资而言，确定性下的投资是收益性最高的投资，很多人认为不确定性下的投资是收益最高的，这不对。因为只有确定了，你敢投资的量才会特别多。 朱平：应该是接近最坏的时候了，虽然从时间上看还没有到，但从跌幅上看差不多了。这一次上证指数下跌到 3,500 点，跟中国经济和美国的金融危机都没有关系，就是因为股价太高，大小非减持；跌到 3,000 点或者 2,500 点，这是因为中国经济减速、宏观调控、油价上升和次贷危机；跌到 2,500 点以下，就因为金融危机了。我们现在看，2,000 点左右的时候，中国股市总体市盈率大概在 14 倍左右，如果 GDP 明年保持 8% 的增长，那么企业盈利的绝对水平不会下降，也就是说估值水平还可以维持。因此，我说跌幅已经差不多了，但是时间上还没有到，因为很多经济学家都预测美国从今年三季度到明年一季度会有连续三个季度的衰退，所以明年一季度、二季度可能是最困难的时候。 林羿：各国市场的情况是不一样的。我们认为中国 A 股已经达到了合理的适度，比如今年年初我们还认为 A 股太贵了，当然我们认为当时的 A 股有 210% 的溢价，到 9 月份溢价就只有 6% 了。总之，我们认为 A 股市场已经到了比较合理的时候，我们也欣赏中国政府最近一系列的措施，并且认为中国能够成功地实现经济软陆。中国 2008 年的 GDP 增长还能够保持在 9% 甚至以上，明年中国经济也还会有不错的表现。相对而言，中长期看中国还是我们最看好的一个国家，而且我们认为中国证券市场已经将中国经济中的不利因素充分考虑进去了。美国市场与中国稍有不同，因为接下来经济可能出现负增长，所以证券市场可能还会继续下跌或者保持目前剧烈振荡的局势。如果说明年下半年美国经济有所缓解，那么我们认为美国股市下半年也会有所起色。 问：对大宗商品（黄金、石油及其他基础原料）市场有何看法？ 谢国忠：我对工业原料不大看好，看好的是贵金属（黄金）和能源。能源受到金融危机的影响，价格下降比较多，但能源的供给还是有限的。我短钱和长期都看好黄金和能源。
2009 投资主题 问：金融危机对你们的投资策略产生了哪些影响？ 林羿：我们的投资策略并没有因为金融危机而有任何改变。普信有 71 年的历史，我们一贯坚持的是以客户利益为出发点，进行长线投资，不做短期投资。像衍生品投资，我们都不参与。 我们是通过严格的基本面研究，奉行自下而上的策略，从公司－行业－板块－国家－地区，为客户挖掘投资机会。我们 70 多年的历史证明，这种策略无论是在经济发展还是衰退、市场好还是市场坏的时候，都是有效的。特别是目前这种情况下，有很多恐慌情绪的因素，是非理性的悲观，市场没有如实地反映经济和公司的基本面，我们更要坚持我们的投资策略。经济增长确实在放缓，但市场下跌的程度远远超过了经济减缓的程度。目前，有很多基本面很好的公司，因为市场情绪的打压，价格非常便宜，甚至到了超合理的程度，因此像我们这样的奉行基本面自下而上和长线投资的公司，就会获益。我们认为市场上有非常多的价值投资机会。 问：你看好的 2009 年投资主题是……？是不是已经准备投资 A 股了？ 林羿：是的，我们刚刚获得了证监会 QFII 资格的批准。第二步是要获得外管局给我们的额度。一旦额度拿到，根据目前的情况，我们会马上入市。关於投资主题，我们比较看好中国的消费、零售、保险、媒体、基础设施建设等行业和板块。 杨锐：与一些人的观点不同，第一，我不看好消费。一方面，从 10 年前甚至更早，大家就知道消费比投资更重要。但我对目前中国的消费还要打个问号，中国人的储蓄率（40%）很高，但都不敢花。想让老百姓花钱，你必须让他有一个稳定的收入预期，另外还要有完善的社保体系。另一方面，消费类公司的估值较高。第二，我不太看好银行。我判断，银行必须为中国避免经济下行做贡献。第三，我不看好到现在还比港股贵一倍的股票。这样，剩下的还有多少？ 朱平：我们认为上游压力比较大，能源稍好一点，但牛市短期也很难出现。比较稳定的是医药、国家主导的投资如铁路、电力设备及通信，等等。消费有一定的变数，好的消息是中国经济发展到现在，国家的政策调整都是有利於消费的；不好的一面是经济减速会对消费有所打压。因此我认为，如果消费继续调整，那么明年是一个好的买入时间。 长期而言，我看好消费。中国扩大内需有一个非常有利的条件，中国是国有企业占主体，如果你把国有企业的财富都按人头算，那中国的财富分配是非常平均的，这一点与其他国家是不一样的。比如国有企业给老百姓分红，如果说经济确实很差，必须启动内需，国家有这个条件，就不排除可能会采用它。 我认为最好的还是优势制造业，全球产业在向中国转移，这些被转移的产业以及我们在一些小领域有一些创新，而这些都是未来五到十年赚大钱的机会。前提当然是中国经济能够取得成功，如果说中国人均年收入到 3,000 美元就停住了，那不管你买什么都赚不了多少钱。如果说中国人均年收入能够从 3,000 美元不断增长到 8,000 甚至 1 万美元，经济总量超越日本甚至美国，这种状态有一个表现形式─中国肯定会有一大批全球优秀的企业。我认为，材料、装备、机械、电子等行业都有可能出现优秀的企业。服务领域也是我们看好的，包括零售、传媒、旅游等。 问：除了中国以外，普信看好的国家还有哪些？ 林羿：总体而言，与发达市场相比，新兴市场经济弹性更高，股市可能会表现更好一些。新兴市场由於基础设施建设的内需比较强，还远远没有达到饱和的程度。像中国、巴西、墨西哥、中东、俄罗斯等国家和地区还在大力地进行基础设施建设，这种情况最少还要保持三到四年。因此，虽然认为新兴市场和发达市场都有比较好的机会，但会稍微超配新兴市场。
投资者建议 谢国忠：2009 年可以买股票。 王志浩：2009 年是高风险的一年，这种情况下要重视安全。投资时不仅要考虑资产根本的价值，还要考虑市场的情绪。现在有些人说 A 股的市盈率很有吸引力，但我认为在经济下行的时候，不完全是价值决定价格，投资者的情绪起了很大的作用。在接下来的三、四个月里，我们不会听到什么好消息，只有中央会宣布一种积极的财政政策是个好消息。因此我觉得上半年应当重视安全，下半年如果看到宏观经济恢复的信号，那可以考虑承担一些风险。我们的看法是，中国经济有两年比较低的增长率。 朱平：对一般投资者而言，长期投资肯定是消费和服务，当然最好适度分散。 杨锐：（1）普通的投资者一般看短期的收益，最好让专业的人干专业的事。（2）要有长期的观点，要让时间给你赚钱。（3）投资是一个组合，现金、存款、股票和国债都有一些。去年、前年风气很不好，有的人用银行信用卡透支的钱买股票，这不能称为投资。 林羿：（1）千万不要把投资作为赌博，总是寻找快进快出的暴利机会。要把投资的时间拉长，做一位长线投资者，做好自己的研究工作，不要人云亦云。实践证明，长线投资者是最成功的，短线操作可能一两次能成功，但不会永远成功。（2）不要在目前的情况下，动摇之前已经确定的投资计划。如果你是一个长期投资者，你制定的投资计划一定是理性的，在市场上升和下降的时候，你都应当坚持同一个投资策略。（3）要了解定期定投所带来的价值，这与第 2 条是密切相关的。根据市场的涨跌调整投资策略，事后证明往往是错误的。 12/19/2008 Even Moore's law has collapsed?tech sector:
1.Why It's Going to Get a Lot Worse
2.郭台銘表示，景氣深不見底，比想像情況還大三倍以上. 3.何伯权：第二人生
12/18/2008 Good luck to J! (非诚勿扰)<非诚勿扰>在公映了，里面的征婚启示是这样写的：“你要想找一帅哥就别来了，你要想找一钱包就别见了，硕士学历以上的免谈，上海女人免谈，女企业家免谈(小商小贩除外)，省得咱们互相都会失望。刘德华和阿汤哥那种财貌双全的郎君是不会来征你的婚的，当然我也没做诺丁山的梦。您要真是一仙女我也接不住，没期待您长得跟画报封面一样看一眼就魂飞魄散…… ”。
我的大学小J同学，系花No.2也在征婚（No.1是我的上铺，甜蜜已婚）。能读得下我如此枯燥无味的博客的人基本上就是几个搞金融经济的朋友，所以把小J同学的启示转帖在此。我非常钦佩小J的勇气，小J是公认美女，模特身材，Duke U的Phd,现在香港某大学教书育人，有上海女人的细致风情，却断无上海女人的娇揉造作。非要问她的缺点，我倒是觉得她对于感情有些过于执着,"想要寻找另一个有能力幸福的人一起去体会那种所谓的amazing happiness"。你要问我如此难得的佳人，为何现在还要征婚，我只能建议你去看电影<非诚勿扰>，其实我从心底里觉得：不要以为too good to be true, 只要你有勇气。 有心人可以给我msn留言，我会发给你照片和电邮地址. -------------------------征文的分界线-----------------------------------------------
叔本华说过只有哲学家的婚姻才有可能幸福。叔本华还说过真正的哲学家并不需要婚姻。这两句话加在一起，我的理解就是婚姻对于需要它的人来说并不能带来幸福。
我是哲学家吗？当然不是。我本身幸福吗？我觉得是的。只是我很贪心。想要寻找另一个有能力幸福的人一起去体会那种所谓的amazing happiness。
失恋的人总是觉得再也不会找到了。恋爱中的人也总是觉得当然会。我，只是一个客串教统计的。所以我相信这只是一个概率的问题。虽然发生在你身上的，只能是零或一。
我的专职是教经济。供给需求，成本收益才算本行。作为一个平常的人，可以落入社会常规中会省力省心很多。以我自己的了解，对我而言，收益上是 找到一个合适的人 〉一个人 〉凑或一个人。只不过，在“找到一个合适的人”前面再乘上那个概率，就不知道了。
所以我本想节约一下成本，就不找了。若是天上掉馅饼，就接着吧。只是天上的馅饼到现在都没有砸到我，所以就想努个力，可还是想偷个懒，于是就决定征婚吧。
女，77年生，170cm。 相貌：60%（都是在我自己眼里，以下同。） IQ: 80% EQ: 50% 学历：博士（普通常识也就相当于一高中生。） 最大的优点：善良 最大的缺点：不够平和，有些偏颇，固执 兴趣：杂。读书（也杂），旅游，宅在家里，室内装修，熊猫...... 经济：可以养活自己
想要找一个男的（废话 1. 善良，带些温和,带些慈悲。但不要是没有原则的好好先生。（觉得比较接近“谦谦君子，温润如玉”。） 2. 平和包容（这个世界有很多的灰色，也有玫瑰色。我希望他看到这些，能够包容，与人平和。这点我自己做的不好，所以更在意些。） 3. 正直坦诚，有担当。（有句话叫作“成者王侯败者寇”，可还有句话叫作“大丈夫行事，论是非，不论厉害；论逆顺，不论成败”。这样的大丈夫就是正直坦诚，有担当的。） 4. 有意思 (几十年的，对着个有意思的人生活会容易很多。我也会努力一直作个有意思的人。) 5. 经济：至少可以养活自己和父母。至多不要是亿万富翁。（后半句大家就当我开玩笑好了。） 6.学历: 本科或以上。（只要你不在乎有个博士女朋友就好。）
好了。再补充一下。目前我在香港，但是对地方没有要求，不要太热或太冷就好。有四季的地方优先考虑。 12/17/2008 China's Financial Conumdrum and Global Imbalances承认自己在某些方面的崇洋媚外，西方人的独立求真精神反映在学术上就是逻辑严密和百花争鸣。 我对对经济政策的理解向来就是停留在报刊上的解读，最多就是读读大行的首席经济学家的报告，可惜这次金融海啸让曾经万人敬仰的Greenspan的货币政策都让人质疑，教会我必须要加深理解经济政策的得与失。下面的Ronald McKinnon（斯坦福教授） and Gunther Schnabl （Leipzig University）的观点：人民币应该停止升息而采取相对稳定的固定汇率+3%的浮动，其实也是张五常从2006年就一直提倡的观点(但是切忌的是防止人民币持续贬值的预期，如果这样的话金融机构和个人、企业又会把人民币换成美金，造成通缩加重并进而形成流动性陷阱)。同时文章也间接证实了郎咸平的观点--07/08年国内的罕见通胀的主因并非来自于所谓的流动性过剩，更多是由于人民币过快升值的预期和sterilization下央行对于currency issued的失控造成。但是在通胀出现后央行采取的历史罕见的11次提高商业银行的reserve ratio的措施，收缩信贷使得企业基本上很难取得投资所需的贷款，表现为高企的贷款利率，企业投资无钱，就收缩投资，却造成整个社会的net savings surplus变大，于是又回到current account surplus(dominated by trade surplus)的更大积累，从而加剧人民币过快升值的预期和加大sterilization操作难度，造成>30%的2007年的reserve accumulation无法被sterilized,直接进入currency in circulation,表现为currency in circulaition增速从2000年的5%到2007年的46%，这被人很容易理解为“流动性过剩”，但数字后面的所反映出的央行被人民币升值预期和sterilization所挟持以致造成currency issued的失控，以及被“流动性过剩”的表面现象所掩盖的商业信贷收缩对工业经济的巨大负面影响的确值得进一步思考。 同时文章提到了很多日本、新加坡的历史经验，谁说中国也有不少讨论日本的汇改得失的文章，不过我更喜欢Ronald McKinnon and Gunther Schnabl 更国际化的视野下的解析。 选自Ronald McKinnon and Gunther Schnabl titled “China’s Financial Conundrum and Global Imbalances” Because China’s current monetary and exchange rate impasse—with its one-way bet in the foreign exchange markets—is overheating its economy with unwanted inflation, its government is inhibited from taking appropriate actions to reduce its ballooning net trade (saving) surplus. Obvious steps for reducing “excess” net saving— such as cutting taxes and increasing government social expenditures would have a near-term inflationary impact. Less obvious is the impact on net saving of forcing (or encouraging) much higher dividend payouts from China’s corporate sector; but, under certain conditions, that too could be expansionary. Meanwhile, China’s current account surplus, uncovered by outflows of private capital, continually worsens the monetary impasse. Figure 17 shows the recent “frenzied” build up of exchange reserves so far in 2008 reaching US$100 billion per month, which is much higher than the monthly current account surplus. Because foreigners misinterpret the trade surplus and accumulating official exchange reserves to be evidence of an undervalued currency, they call for further appreciation of the renminbi. This foreign pressure strengthens the expectation that the renmimbi will be higher in the future, thus causing more inflows of hot money. What is the best way to escape from this conundrum? China can’t end its exchange rate impasse, and the worldwide monetary turmoil that goes with it, on its own. With proper foreign cooperation, however, the monetary impasse from the one-way bet in the foreign exchange markets could be resolved rather quickly. Thus, currency stabilization should precede measures to correct the saving-investment imbalance—which may take months or years to be effective both in China and abroad. Nevertheless, to be successful, the political economy of any international agreement likely requires both as a package deal. China bashing to get the renminbi up can only be stopped if China proposes definite fiscal measures to reduce its future saving surpluses—possibly in conjunction with U.S. efforts to reduce America’s saving deficiency, and overly loose domestic monetary policy leading to a weak dollar. Populist politics aside, what inhibits China and the United States (representing the interests of the industrial economies more generally) from agreeing on such a package deal that would be of such great mutual benefit? Three common misconceptions in economic theory on the role of the exchange rate inhibit any political agreement to stabilize China’s currency. Let us consider each in turn Misconception #1: The exchange rate can affect the trade balance. Many, if not most, economists believe that a country’s net trade balance can be controlled by manipulating the level of its exchange rate. However, a current account surplus (dominated by a trade surplus) just reflects a surplus of saving over investment at home—and the converse abroad. Thus, how a discrete appreciation of a creditor country’s currency will eliminate its saving surplus is neither obvious nor unambiguous. True, its goods would become more expensive to foreigners—the relative price effect. But, in an economy open to international capital flows, domestic investment would fall because appreciation makes the country a more expensive place in which to produce. Also, because China owns huge stocks of foreign currency claims (largely dollars), a negative wealth effect from having the dollar fall against the renminbi would further reduce domestic expenditures—including for imports. This decline in imports offsets the dampening effect of higher foreign currency prices for exports so as to leave any change in the net trade balance small and ambiguous (Qiao 2007). To illustrate this exchange rate—trade balance misconception, it is instructive to revisit the consequences of Japan bashing to get the yen up more than three decades earlier starting with the Nixon shock of August 1971. The yen rose episodically from 360 to the dollar in early 1971 to touch 80 to the dollar in April 1995. “Despite” this enormous cumulative appreciation, Japan’s net trade surplus rose from being negligible in the 1960s to average about 2 percent of GDP in the 1970s, peaked out at about 5 percent in the late 1980s, and remains close to four percent of GDP in 2008 with the yen at 100-110 to the dollar. Massive currency fluctuations had no systematic impact on Japan’s net trade (saving) balance. However, the great nominal appreciations of the yen against the dollar, which Japan more or less welcomed during the worldwide inflation of the 1970s, eventually unhinged Japan’s macro economy (McKinnon and Ohno 1997). In the late 1980s, the syndrome of the ever-higher yen provoked bubbles in Japan’s stock and land markets along with a falling WPI. When the bubbles broke in 1990-91 followed by a further sharp rise in the yen in 1994-95, Japan was thrown into deflationary slump: its infamous “lost decade” of 1992 to 2002. Foreign exchange risk created (and still sustains) a near zero interest liquidity trap that renders monetary policy virtually impotent for stimulating domestic spending. (Goyal and McKinnon , 2003). Although Japan has had modest export-led GDP annual growth of 2 to 3 percent since 2002, a deflationary hangover continues: wages and consumption are stagnant (McKinnon, 2007b). Misconception #2. Ongoing exchange rate appreciation reduces inflation The second, but more subtle, misconception is that ongoing exchange appreciation can reduce domestic price inflation—or, at the very least, insulate the economy from international inflation. China gets much gratuitous advice to appreciate faster in order to “fight inflation”. This admonition is certainly true in the long run, as Japan’s unfortunate experience with eventual deflation from yen appreciation attests. However, for a country emerging from a fixed nominal exchange rate where domestic and foreign rates of price inflation had been more or less aligned, the near-term effect of a well-telegraphed transition to an appreciating currency can be highly inflationary—as with China’s current monetary impasse. In the near-term transition, the inflationary impact from the loss of monetary control can overwhelm the deflationary impact of a higher level of the exchange rate. Again, let us refer to Japan’s earlier experience with this transition problem. Under the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rate parities, the yen had been successfully fixed at 360 to the dollar from 1949 to August 1971, so that price inflation in tradable goods (WPI) between the U.S. and Japan were similar. As early as 1970, however, market participants began to project that the dollar might be depreciated. Hot money began to flow out of the United States into European countries as well as Japan (despite its capital controls). In order to prevent more precipitate appreciation, in 1971-72 the Bank of Japan intervened heavily in the foreign exchange markets with a rapid buildup of foreign exchange reserves and surge in domestic money growth. By 1974, annualized WPI inflation in Japan became higher than in the United States: 31.3 percent versus “just” 18.9 percent in the U.S. Only in the late 1970s did Japanese inflation fall below American—the “long run” relative deflationary effect of a higher yen that most economists expect. But the length and strength of the near term inflationary transition was surprising. China is still in the inflationary “near-term” which, with no change in present circumstances of arm twisting to get the renminbi up, could continue for an uncomfortably long time. Are there circumstances where China should acquiesce to continual reminbi appreciation? Clearly if the center country under the world dollar standard continues to inflate too much, the People’s Bank of China would have little choice but to acquiesce to a managed ongoing appreciation of the renminbi against the dollar. However, the current rate of appreciation is too rapid for securing either near-term monetary control in China or long-term price-level alignment with the United States. Misconception # 3. Floating the rate would equilibrate the foreign exchange market. “Flexibility” is a nicer word than floating. Couldn’t the PBC simply withdraw from the foreign exchange market and let the exchange rate be determined by private market makers—much in the way that the euro’s value against the dollar is determined? No, because this proposed solution presumes that a determinate market exchange rate— which could balance the demand and supply of dollars in terms of renminbi—actually exists if the PBC were to exit the market. Unlike the Europe-United States situation, however, China faces an ongoing currency mismatch leading to the syndrome of “conflicted virtue” (McKinnon and Schnabl 2004, and McKinnon 2005) that prevents private market makers from clearing the excess supply of dollars. What causes the mismatch that undermines the case for floating? The renminbi, like the currencies of other developing economies, is not used significantly for international borrowing or lending; but China couples this gap in its capital markets with an enormous saving (trade) surplus. Thus dollar, rather than renminbi, claims on foreigners continually pile up within the economy. (The dollar is the “default” international money.) Natural private market makers such as Chinese banks—or even insurance companies and pension funds—all have their liabilities to depositors, policy holders, and so forth, denominated in renminbi. Thus, even if the yuan/dollar rate fluctuated only randomly, Chinese financial institutions would be exposed to too much exchange risk (relative to their limited capital) to allow dollar assets continually to pile up on their balance sheets. At some point, they would stop buying new dollar claims associated with the ongoing trade surplus. Consequently, a free float would result in an indefinite upward spiral of the renminbi against the dollar—with no well-defined balance point where Chinese financial institutions become sufficiently willing buyers of dollar assets to stop their further depreciation. This third misconception is linked to the first. A floating but appreciating renminbi would not predictably reduce China’s trade surplus, and dollars would continue to pour into the economy. On the other hand, if China was not an immature creditor country because foreign trade (net saving) was close to being balanced, then no substantial internal currency mismatch would exist and an uneasy float could be possible12. However, the issue is somewhat broader. Suppose China did not have a chronic saving surplus, but its bond markets were still not well developed at different terms to maturity, and there were residual capital controls (as in most developing economies). Then forward markets for private hedging against currency risk becomes difficult to organize and expensive. So, willy nilly, if the government attempted to float the rate, it would soon be drawn back to smooth exchange fluctuations—if only at higher frequencies—in order to reduce the risks seen by exporters and importers. This “fear of floating” is well documented by Carmen Reinhart and Guillermo Calvo (2000 and 2002). 12/16/2008 信用卡法规大斗法新闻说：“美國聯邦準備理事會（Fed）18日將表決信用卡改革規章，如果原案未經大幅修改，將是信用卡業幾十年來最重大的變革。 新規定將禁止一些現行措施，包括發卡業者不得任意提高利率，以及沒有給予合理的期限就向消費者收取滯納金等。聯準會自今年5月就開始考慮修法，但至今仍不願公布最後擬定的細節” source:美信用卡法規 將大翻修 让我又回过头去读了11月30日Oppenheimer & Co投资总监Meredith Whitney的文章“America must keep consumer liquidity flowing”，可以看出随着危机向消费者的口袋日渐加深，美国政府也正向解救消费者迈进。可惜，12月14里起，汇丰和花期都宣布向信用卡借贷者提出加息。 Getting worse before getting betterMorgan Stanley在12日的文章“Calibrating Upside and Downside Risks to Growth Estimates”提到 Darden商学院的系主任Bob Bruner介绍了1907年美国金融危机中JP Morgan如何一个人挽救金融系统，提出一个危机的产生是一系列因素互相作用的结果，因此必须了解这些因素是如何互动，他认为主要包括7大要素：growth,complexity, tight linkage, market psychology, adverse leadership, real shock, and collective action. 同时他强调了领导力，并肯定了JP Morgan在危机处理中的毫无私心地公正力。比共产党还共产党的资本家！China: Getting Worse Before Getting Better (Qing Wang) We think that China’s economic outlook for 2009 is best characterized as ‘getting worse before getting better’, laying the foundation for a firmer recovery in 2010. Further growth deceleration is expected in 1H09, and deflation is a distinct possibility. The effect of massive policy stimulus implemented since October 2008, together with a tepid recovery in G3 economies, is expected to help the Chinese economy regain some growth momentum in 2H09. We construct two alternative scenarios – the bear (featuring 5% GDP growth) and bull (9% GDP growth) cases – to highlight both the downside and upside risks to the 2009 outlook under our base case (7.5% GDP growth). Real estate investment will be the biggest swing factor among the scenarios, in our view. https://wwws.tiff.org/reports/Commentary/2008_Ed2_COM.pdf 12/12/2008 股价因过分低残而反弹，但客观环境不断恶化估计中国刺激内需的政策还有继续出台 2.出口下降2.2%表明上半年以资本密集企业出口高附加值产品比如机械、电子产品来替代劳动密集型产品（纺织、玩具、皮鞋等）的策略在现在已经不再有效。 3.中国人民币贬值空间不大,因为中国出口下滑幅度在世界范围内算最小的一个国家，同时中国的出口份额仍然在不断扩大 4.09年尽管中国的进出口都会降低，但是仍然为正的贸易顺差，主要是因为进口减少速度更大，同时商品市场的价格继续萎靡。 a. 首先是高企的失业率，08年已经有200万人被公司开掉，明年这个数字只会更高， b. 然后就是修改条款3个月以后re-default率达到>50%，让prime也变成subprime. c. 70%的subprime根本可以说在现行法律、会计框架下无拯救希望：因为subprime mortgage的拥有者是债券购买人，他们是很难达成协议削减修改subprime的条款，或者就是subprime的房主都已经失踪了。 尽管最近美国财政部和联储在讨论降低mortage rate to 4.5%，以刺激买房需求。但是普遍认为就业市场不稳下来，还是没有希望稳定房市 银行只买国库券，就是不借贷 她是亦舒的唯一女主角很少有人能写出如此坦荡宽容的文字，比如我就会很自私，一定要数落、猜忌甚至栽赃对方的不是、不仁、不义、不忠，以便自己获得道义上的加分和亲朋好友的情感支持。其实，世界上哪有完美的人呢？但却有完美的感情关系，在这段感情里你没有最爱你自己。“一个人的问题，两个人去修正；一个人的挫败，两个人去承担。我俩是一个团队的，没分高低，输赢也是一体 。”
 周慧敏委托的声明全文如下：
我与倪震识于微时，一起共渡过不能尽算的高低起落，早已磨合了一套我们之间的相处艺术。一个人的问题，两个人去修正；一个人的挫败，两个人去承担。我俩是一个团队的，没分高低，输赢也是一体 。某程度上，周慧敏早已是一位不同面貌的倪震。任谁一方受到伤害，另一方都愿抵御百倍的痛。一起走过将近二十个年头，绝对不是在一般人的准则下相爱，但外人却总爱把自己的一套价值观去评价、批判属于我俩之间的爱情。 今天我能够成为自爱，懂得爱人，拥有着无比勇气与承担的女人，请不要小看这个精神伴侣在我背后为我付出过的一切努力，包容，宠爱，照顾与扶持。都生活了这么久，没有倪震，成就不了今天的周慧敏。所以我敢大胆向各位说一句：“我的伴侣绝对犯得起这个错误”，而这句说话，亦只我一人有资格去定论。看到伴侣事后为我做出的承担，我马上就原谅了他，又怎会有某些媒体创作出来的痛哭，拍台，大骂，这般无稽的谎言呢 ？不到一天，我看到了很多无比荒诞，狠毒，凉薄的炒作与咀咒，妖魔鬼怪都涌进来，愈炒作愈黑暗，致人于死地。 公众人物谈恋爱要承受异于常人理解的压力，从当年决定和不按常规行事的倪震谈恋爱，就知道是一场革命了，亦没有失望过。香港这片是非地，无风三尺浪，暗箭来自四方八面，行差踏错一步就如掉进斗兽场。当中我们需要的信心，包容，付出是一般情侣无法体会的。显微镜下看世界，任谁都难合格。我告诉大家，我们不害怕，也不逃避，只是有点累了。在回复到朋友关系以后，我们要好好享受不用被批判的日子，大家为未来再次装备出发。我相信身份的改变，疏离不了我们之间微妙的关爱。 最后，我要向每位真正支持爱护我的朋友说：“我没枉费与倪震轰轰烈列地爱过，永远刻骨铭心，此生无憾。而我自己亦都会好好地勇敢活下去，一如过往。”多谢各位。 周慧敏 二零零八年十二月十一日 专栏：Minsky时代source: UBS"中国A股策略 2008年10月31日" Hyman Minsky 从来没有像现在这样知名。这位在学术界小有名字，1996年去世的老先生之所以出 现在各种媒体报道中，因为他所论述的严峻经济/金融状况在2007/2008年出现了。 Minsky研究的主要方向是债务和经济的关系，在肯定了信用扩张对于经济增长的正面意义之外， 他也指出信用/债务的极度扩张很可能催生资产泡沫，而一旦资产泡沫破灭，其对金融和经济的紧 缩效应将非常明显。 西方主流经济学家通常认为，经济危机是错误政策导向（不恰当的紧缩货币政策导致1929年大萧 条）或者外部因素冲击（1970年代的石油危机）导致的。而Minsky认为资本主义社会本身就包含 经济危机的风险，持续稳定的经济和发达的金融市场，将诱导人们过度借贷，造成资产泡沫。当 泡沫注定破灭的时候，金融和经济的双重危机也就到来了。 Minsky最核心的观点就是“稳定本身就是不稳定的”（Stability is unstable），即长期稳定的经济环 境，导致投资者相信经济将永远稳定，从而愿意冒更大的风险。他们开始过渡借贷，并且以高价 购买资产。Minsky界定了三种类型的借贷人。第一种，避险型贷款人（Hedged borrowers），他们 拥有足够的现金流来支付全部贷款；第二种，投机型贷款人（Speculative borrowers），他们的现 金足以支付利息，但是他们会“滚动”贷款，不断借新钱来还旧钱。第三种，Ponzi贷款人，这些人 根本无力偿还贷款本金，也偿还不了利息，他们只能依赖于贷款购买的资产价格不断上涨，以便 让他们获得再抵押贷款来偿还利息。Ponzi贷款人进行过度借贷的理由是，因为经济将持续平稳增 长，资产价格也将持续上涨，所以他们将始终具有资产抵押再贷款的能力，纯粹依赖于资产价格 上涨Ponzi贷款人才能偿还借贷的利息。随着社会经济持续稳定，资产价格膨胀，Ponzi类贷款人 逐渐增加，进一步推动了资产价格上涨。但是这种经济/金融体系和资产价格都是建立在过于宽松 的信用/借贷体系上，非常脆弱。 这种资产泡沫曾经短暂地出现在1970年代的发达国家金融市场，也表现为2000年全球的IT泡沫。 但这次美国次级债所引发的冲击更加巨大，预计持续时间也更长。过去10年全球经济的稳定增 长，提高了投资者的风险偏好，出现了越来越多Ponzi类借贷人；另一方面，金融机构因为激烈的 市场竞争，主动降低借贷门槛，为过度借贷提供了条件。并且创造了大量衍生产品向投资者出 售，增加了资产泡沫。由于信贷很容易获得，大量Ponzi类贷款人进入资本市场，他们拿着借来的 钱炒高资产价格，相信还有更傻的傻瓜成为下一个买单人。 然而，一旦资产价格下跌，上述的逻辑环节将被激烈的扭转。UBS高级经济顾问George Magnus这 样来描述资产泡沫破灭后的Minsky时代：面对复杂严峻的金融形势，提供融资的借款人将变得异 常小心，非常严格（甚至苛刻）来审查每项贷款，大幅降低金融杠杆。整个金融市场的风险偏好 大幅上升。在金融危机面前，投资者不相信任何承诺的回报，他们的资产组合越来越保守，愿意 手持现金一直到资产价格变得非常具有吸引力。在这个过程中，投资者和金融机构将遭受沉重打 击，并且拖累实体经济增长。 12/11/2008 戏剧化的时代这是个戏剧化的时代，Bill Miller旗下基金08年损失超过58%，金牌基金经理遭遇滑铁卢。 另外一边，Bill Fleckenstein宣布真是告别过去12年的单边卖空的对冲基金，从09年起开始操作long fund.Fleckenstein Shutting Down Short Hedge Fund Bank and Broker Default Risk汇丰真是强啊！市场一致投票认为汇丰倒闭的风险全球最小。看来汇丰全民学些巴塞尔规约是有道理的，这个风险管控太强。 source:http://bespokeinvest.typepad.com/bespoke/2008/12/bank-and-broker-default-risk.html Below we highlight the current CDS prices of 13 global banks and brokers. These prices represent the cost per year to insure $10,000 worth of debt for 5 years. As shown, Morgan Stanley (MS) still has the highest default risk, followed by Goldman (GS), Citigroup (C), Merrill Lynch (MER), UBS (UBS), and Bank of America (BAC). While none of the firms below have CDS less than 100 basis points, HSBC, Deutsche Bank (DB), Wells Fargo (WFC), and JP Morgan (JPM) have the lowest default risk at the moment.
Q Ratio Signals ‘Horrific’ Market Bottom, CLSA SaysCLSA Ltd. strategist Russell Napier 认为Tobin's Q ratio尽管已经跌落到average水平，但是并没有真正反映出通缩，也就是说从目前的0.6、0.7的水平上跌倒1921, 1932, 1949 and 1982的0.3的水平。照此推算，S&P500要从目前的900水平还要直线下落到400-500.如果预言成真，会不会是世界末日？
Dec. 10 (Bloomberg) -- A global stock slump may have further to go, according to Tobin’s Q ratio, which compares the market value of companies to the cost of their constituent parts, CLSA Ltd. strategist Russell Napier said. The ratio, developed in 1969 by Nobel Prize-winning economist James Tobin, shows the Standard & Poor’s 500 Index is still too expensive relative to the cost of replacing assets, said Napier. While the 39 percent drop in the index this year pushed equity prices below replacement cost, history suggests the ratio must sink further as deflation sets in, he said. The S&P may plunge another 55 percent to 400 by 2014, Napier said. “The Q has come down to its average, however it’s not always stopped at the average,” said Napier, Institutional Investor’s top-ranked Asia strategist from 1997-1999. “It has tended to go significantly below that in long bear markets.” Shares have fallen this year as the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression caused almost $1 trillion of bank losses and dragged the world’s largest economies into recessions. The MSCI World Index has tumbled 44 percent in 2008, set for the biggest annual decline in its four-decade history. The S&P 500 today increased 1.2 percent to 899.24. Bear-Market Scholar Napier, who teaches at Edinburgh Business School and advised clients to buy oil in 2002 before it tripled, based his S&P 500 forecast on the Q ratio for U.S. equities as well as the 10-year cyclically adjusted price-to-earnings ratio, another measure of long-term value. Before the trough in 2014, investors are likely to see a so- called bear market rally for the next two years as central bank actions delay the onset of deflation, Napier said. “In the long run, stocks will become even cheaper,” said Brian Shepardson, who helps manage $1.9 billion at Xenia, Ohio- based James Investment Research. The firm’s James Balanced Golden Rainbow Fund beat 98 percent of similar funds this year. “There’s a likelihood of some type of rally and further pullback surpassing the lows we’ve already set.” The Q ratio on U.S. equities has dropped to 0.7 from a peak of 2.9 in 1999, and reaching 0.3 has always signaled the end of a bear market, said Napier, 44, the author of “Anatomy of the Bear,” a study of how business cycles change course. The Q ratio for U.S. equities has fluctuated between 0.3 and 3 in the past 130 years. When the gauge is more than one, it indicates the market is overvaluing company assets, while a Q ratio of less than one signifies shares are undervalued because it is cheaper to buy companies than to build them from the ground up. Previous Bottoms At the end of the four largest U.S. bear markets in 1921, 1932, 1949 and 1982, the Q ratio fell to 0.3 or lower, and history is likely to repeat, said Napier. From the 1982 trough, the S&P 500 grew more than 14-fold to the middle of 2000, when Napier says the last bull market ended. Napier started his career in 1989 as a fund manager for the Scottish firm Baillie Gifford & Co. As CLSA’s Asian strategist he called the bottom of Asian equity markets in mid-1998. This year, he predicted gains in Japanese stocks prior to a 38 percent decline in the Nikkei 225 Stock Average. Napier’s prediction for a plunge in the S&P 500 hinges on deflation that is unlikely to materialize, according to Bob Brusca, president of Fact & Opinion Economics and a former chief of international markets at the New York Federal Reserve. Consumer prices dropped 1 percent in October. So-called core prices, which exclude food and energy, dropped just 0.1 percent, and prices will probably increase 0.7 percent in 2009, according to the median estimate of economists surveyed by Bloomberg. No Deflation “Oil and commodity prices have fallen, but we’re not seeing a widespread deflation like he’s talking about,” Brusca said in an interview in New York. “To have what he discusses, we’d have to have terrible deflation.” Measures such as Tobin’s Q ratio and a 10-year price-to- earnings ratio are “valuable tools,” said Andrew Milligan, the Edinburgh-based head of global strategy at Standard Life Investments, which oversees about $190 billion. Milligan said he is bullish on U.S. equities for now as central bank efforts to fight deflation will push the market higher. Awaiting Signals “For those who are worried about losing much of their investment almost overnight, very clearly you’d want to wait for those signals to give a much stronger case,” he said. “The bear market will have “a painful resolution, it’s just a question of how painful, over what period of time and for what parties.” Federal Reserve Chairman Ben S. Bernanke’s indication that he will use “quantitative easing” to prevent deflation points to a stock market rally that may last for the next two years, Napier said. With quantitative easing, a tool pioneered by the Bank of Japan, central banks can stimulate inflation by printing money and flooding the market with cash in order to encourage consumers to spend. The government’s efforts will eventually fail as ballooning government debt devalues the dollar, causes investors to flee U.S. assets and takes the S&P 500 to its eventual bottom in 2014, Napier said. “Bear markets always end for exactly the same reason, and that is the market begins to price in deflation,” he said. “The results are always horrific.” 世界银行的08年4季度中国经济分析关于中国的分析研究，往往外国人做得更彻底和透彻。不知道是因为他们的独立思考精神造成的，还是他们的学术功底更招式造成。这篇世界银行的08年4季度中国经济分析真的值得一读再读，23页里面没有废话和重复，看完一遍以后我想自己对中国经济真的什么也不懂。 实在没有时间研读，也可以看看两位作者的采访录，不过不读原文实在太可惜。source:http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTCHINA/Resources/Quarterly_December_2008.pdf source:http://discuss.worldbank.org/content/interview/detail/5915/ 1 December 2008, 8:00 AM EST
Report authors David Dollar, Country Director, and Louis Kuijs, Senior Economist, answered your questions in a live online discussion on December 1, 2008. To learn more about the report, read the China Quarterly Update. Read more about David Dollar TranscriptOtabor Isaac:
What in your own view, makes China domestic economy thick? Also,what lesson(s) could other countries of the world learn from China economy?
Thank you. David Dollar:
China has a lot of things going for it. Chinese families (though not necessarily the government) invest a lot in their children’s education. China has a particular model of globalization: it is very open to imports and direct investment, but not to portfolio capital flows. Right now, this looks a pretty smart strategy. China also has a pragmatic approach to infrastructure: the cost of power and using expressways and ports is relatively high compared to other developing countries. The result is that infrastructure pays for itself and the country has been able to expand its networks very quickly. See my paper on lessons of China for more details. Da Do Cong:
What the sector that Chinese goverment will spend $586 bil are? and the prospect?
Louis Kuijs:
The November 9 stimulus package contains commitments to carry out projects infrastructure projects on public housing (RMB 280 bln), rural infrastructure (RMB 370 bln), transport (rail, airports, and roads) (RMB 1800 bln), health and education (including building schools and hospitals) (RMB 40 bln), the environment (including water and sanitation, sewage facilities, and restoration projects) (RMB 350 bln), technological innovation (RMB 160 bln), and post earth quake reconstruction (RMB 1000 bln). The number in (brackets) are estimates by the government on spending in these areas. M.WINDFIELD:
Do you think that the stimulus package that China proposes will allow it to grow at double digit next year?
Do you think that their piblic works projects would do, what the public works projects did for the US during the depression? If the stimulus works, would it also bring about an increase in the quality of manufactured goods? And how would see the increase in quality of their goods affecting import and exports? Louis Kuijs:
We think that the stimulus package will be very important in supporting growth in China in a very difficult year internationally. Our GDP growth forecast for 2009 is 7.5 %. It is always difficult to make comparisons. But at least we can say that the projects that are secured and advanced by the November 9 decision will be important to support growth in the short run and, in the long term, help China support some important long term objectives and improve people’s living standards. These measures in this package are not directly geared at helping industry, although it is fair to say that they may help industry indirectly (better railways, better education). David:
I understand that the recent large stimulus package was primarily for infrastructure and reconstruction in earthquake-affected areas. At the same time, China is in the process of reforming the health sector, with an expectation that "efforts will be made to gradually increase the proportion of government input in the total health expenses to significantly reduce the basic medical and health service costs from individuals; the increase of government health spending should stand at a faster pace than the increase of recurrent expenditure in order to gradually increase the proportion of health spending among recurrent expenditure". Do you see any threat from the economic downturn to this increase in government input to the health sector to reduce the burden of the cost of illness on individuals, and do you expect the increased input to the health sector to come from central sources, or that the responsibility to increase funding will be devolved to local governments?
David Dollar:
We have received several good questions on health: the formal 4 trillion Yuan package has only a modest amount for health: about 10% will go to health and education. But the package is mostly for infrastructure construction and the need to construct new health and education facilities is not great. There will be a separate decision soon about the total budget for 2009. In recent years the central contribution for health has been rising rapidly, and I expect that to continue in 2009. One difficult year of growth will not affect that. If, however, China has several years of slower growth then that would inevitably affect the provision of services. This global downturn is an opportunity for China to focus more spending on domestic needs, of which a stronger, more rational health system is a great example. If the government spends more recurrent budget on health and education that will be a direct stimulus to the economy and also lay a solid foundation for the future by making people feel more secure and building up the country’s human capital. So, I think that it is important to continue the health system reform and put more central resources into it. Azam:
what will be the effects of this on the rest of the world?
David Dollar:
China stimulating its economy and maintaining a healthy growth rate is very good for the rest of the world. Because China is quite an open economy in terms of imports, part of its stimulus will spill over and create demand in other countries. Some of China’s imports are parts for processing and then re-export, so they are based on final demand elsewhere. But the majority of imports is not of this kind and is related to China’s domestic demand. Based on the stimulus package, our forecast for 2009 has domestic demand growing at 8.9%, and import growth (excluding processing) at 10.7%. The World Bank forecasts that global trade overall will decline 2.5% in 2009, so China is definitely a bright spot in terms of providing stimulus to the world economy. Its demand will help the wide range of countries that export to China – products from petroleum and minerals, to food, to high-tech machinery and software. An important note of caution, though: China is not important enough in global final demand to fully offset the declines that are projected for the US, Europe, and Japan. China’s continued healthy growth makes things better than they would otherwise be for the world economy. Fengming Cui:
What do "strong macroeconomic fundamentals" refer to?
How does room for policy cover the systematic issues that lead to a gulf between the rich and the poor? Louis Kuijs:
That is a good question. In our view “strong macroeconomic fundamentals” mainly refers to (i) strong fiscal and external positions and cushions; (ii) the capacity to growth at relatively high rates without showing the symptoms that emerging markets often suffer from: high inflation and/or external deficits. As to your second question, I would say that, in terms of the ability of policy to respond to boost growth in the short run, income gaps do not really come into play. However, income equality, especially between rural and urban areas, is one of the major issues, or “imbalances” that the medium term project to “rebalance” the economy is meant to address. In short, “rebalanced” growth, growth that relies more on services and consumption, instead of industry, investment and exports, is more labor intensive. That means that it will create more urban jobs, draws in more migrants from the country side, and thus raises labor productivity and income of those left on the country side. In particular, “rebalancing” measures such as increasing government spending on health, education, and social security help boost disposable incomes and living standards in the rural areas. Dr. Ashish Manohar Urkude:
We are interested to know what are the major initiatives taken by China to avoid direct and indirect impact of the present Global Financial Crisis and its further Spill-Over effect/s?
**Dr. Ashish Manohar Urkude, India Louis Kuijs:
Most of the steps taken in China to prevent direct impact of the present global financial crisis have actually been taken in the past. China’s banks did not buy significant amounts of "toxic" assets. Moreover, China has capital controls, which means that the pressures on international financial markets do not exert a strong influence onto China’s financial system and sector. Very high national saving for an extended period of time is reflected in high foreign reserves and a lot of liquidity in the banking system. China’s real economy is open to the world, however, and this is were the spillover of the international crisis enters China, via lower exports and reduced confidence. The main response of China’s government to the downward impact this will have on overall growth and employment is too shift to expansionary macro economic policies, with an easing of the monetary stance and, importantly, expansionary fiscal policy, with substantial increases in government-influenced spending and some tax cuts. The aim of these policies is to boost domestic demand, in order to offset in part the netative influence coming from the international crisis. PERDRIZET:
Is the China likely to weaken its currency to improve effects of its policy stimulus ?
Louis Kuijs:
Currency policy is complex, with many considerations playing a role. We think that China’s decision to strengthen the link with the US dollar while the dollar was appreciating strongly against most other currencies globally contributed to financial and economic stability internationally (just like a decision not to devalue played a similar role in the wake of the Asian crisis 10 years ago). Going forward, we think that, at a time of a very weak international outlook, China is right to focus on stimulating domestic demand. We also think that China’s fundamental competitiveness position is still good. Therefore, we think it is not very useful to try to “crowd in” market share by lowering export prices on international markets resulting from exchange rate depreciation. Ngan A.Lam:
What do you think World Bank has the responsibility and has to deal with current world's economy condition ? do you have any tangible strategy ?
David Dollar:
The World Bank has a useful role to play in the current global economic conditions. The Bank’s capital base is sound and we can borrow easily on world capital markets, so that the President of the Bank has said that we could double or triple our lending in 2009 if necessary. There are quite a few developing countries that have fundamentally sound policies but that are having trouble refinancing their external debt in the current market conditions. The Bank can be part of the lending to these countries to get them through the troubled times. Some of that lending will be directed to specific projects in infrastructure and the social sectors to help ensure that development investments proceed despite the global downturn. I also think that the analysis and advice from the World Bank is extremely useful to developing countries in this unique situation. The advice covers both macroeconomic policies, but also important structural issues such as how to strengthen the safety net for the many workers and farmers who will be adversely affected. Deborah Chu:
What would be the best way for China to appropriate its sovereign wealth fund?
David Dollar:
The purpose of the SWF is to earn a better long-run return on the large amount of US dollar assets that China has accumulated because of several years of large trade surpluses. Because of the downturns in many equity and property markets worldwide, this is actually a good time for SWFs to purchase assets. It is always a smart strategy to diversify your portfolio, so I would encourage the SWFs to invest in both developed and emerging markets, and in different kinds of assets such as common stocks, real estate trusts, and corporate and public bonds. If SWFs buy assets now, they will play a useful role in helping stabilize these markets, and they will meet their objectives of getting a good long-term return. Deborah Chu:
China has been blamed for the job loss of American workers. Is the rationale reasonable?
David Dollar:
I don’t think it is fair to blame developing countries such as China for loss of jobs in developed countries like the U.S. The total net job creation in a developed country is primarily the result of the country’s own macroeconomic and structural policies. If an economy is not generating enough jobs, there are macro and micro tools to correct this. My own view is that job creation depends primarily on the incentives for innovation and long-term growth. In the case of the U.S., things that would help would be reform of healthcare to take the cost off of the employer, immigration reform to ensure a steady flow of workers with different skills (especially the high-tech skills in short supply), fiscal policies and incentives to raise the savings rate, and expanded investment in critical infrastructure (both hard infrastructure such as transport and soft infrastructure such as universities). In the short run trade can accelerate shifts from one type of job to another and that can be a serious problem for particular workers and communities. I favor a forward-looking policy of helping workers adjust. Trying to preserve particular jobs through import protection has always failed in my reading of history. Deborah Chu:
What are the most serious challenges China is facing?
David Dollar:
Right at this moment China faces a serious challenge to quickly reorient its economy away from exports toward domestic needs. In retrospect, China should have started this sooner. If China had more aggressively pursued policies to encourage consumption in the past few years, it would not have built up so much capacity in the export industries and would not have such a difficult adjustment now. Looking beyond the next year, the biggest challenge for the country is natural resource scarcity and environmental degradation. China can turn this crisis to good purpose by using its stimulus package to build for the future economy not for the old model. The infrastructure spending that will go to high-speed passenger rail, public transportation, waste water treatment, environmental clean-up, health, and education will stimulate the economy immediately and also lay a foundation for a greener economic development in the future. Henry Maigurira:
What are challenges China facing in implementing the$587 000 000 000.00 rescue package.
Louis Kuijs:
We think that among the key challenges are (i) to ensure that the selection, preparation, and execution of the projects is as rule-based and efficient as possible, with an eye to long-term development needs instead of short term visibility. This task is made more difficult by the large size of the overall package and the speed with which it is meant to be executed. (ii) to make trade offs with regard to the key criteria with which measures should be judged: large short term impact on growth and support for medium and long term objectives. For instance, creating demand for the steel industry is currently a very effective way to boost short term growth. But it does not really help China meet its medium and long term objectives. Grant Colquhoun:
Do you have a feel for the degree to which the slowdown in China is being driven by weaker confidence as opposed to weaker fundamentals. What will cause the real estate maket to turn around and when?
David Dollar:
I think that so far the slowdown in China is caused by weaker fundamentals. Consumer confidence has held up pretty well so far. But in terms of fundamentals, the property market got overheated and the government put on the brakes. At the same time, processing exports started to slow down. The result has been a sharp drop in the heavy industries related to construction followed by declines in the processing export sectors. It is possible that consumer confidence will now weaken, which would be unfortunate. Hopefully the government's fiscal and monetary stimulus will boost confidence. It is hard to predict when the housing market will turn around. In the prime cities prices have gone up a lot and there needed to be a correction. Now there is a lot of unsold commercial and residential space. If the market works well, prices will come down in response to this slack market. The long-term demand for housing in Chinese cities is high, so I am convinced that if prices come down to reasonable levels that the market will resume. The risk is that developers and banks are reluctant to accept losses and keep prices high in the face of excess supply. In that case the slump could last a long time. Let's hope China learns from Japan's experience with the property slump in the 1990s. It is better to take the losses and move on rather than cling to unrealistic valuations. Marina Makovskaya:
Many thanks for this opportunity to get more knowledge. What are the most serious challenges regarding consumer goods market and its export China is facing? What will be the effects of this on the rest of the world?
Louis Kuijs:
China’s exporters of consumer goods are undoubtedly going to face a tough year, with global demand going into slowdown. This means that pressure increases on these producers to upgrade their production process and production package, and cut costs. While this is part of a productive process to restructure and upgrade the economy, it leads to strain and dislocation for the firms and workers involved. In my understanding, the impact of these pressures will be felt largely in China itself. One thing that some countries may feel would be pressures if Chinese firms move up the ladder and become competitors in certain products and markets that they were not active in before. Marina Makovskaya:
What are the measures taken by China to protect their global consumer goods market share?
Louis Kuijs:
China’s government is encouraging export firms to upgrade, develop brands, and make other improvements. In addition, the VAT rebates that exporters receive—which are full in most other countries but have traditionally in China only been partial—have been increased recently for several types of consumer goods. amal sarkar:
chinise government is planning to go for land reform. they proposes that govt will empower the farmers so taht they can trasfer their land to other for long term lease.that land can be used for other than agricultural purposes. another proposal was that govt will increase the lease period from 30 years to 70 years. my question is whether proposed kand reform can change the chinise rural economy,there was apprehantion in some quarter that people will loos land and fresh land looser will be aditional burden on urban econony. wahat is your opinion
David Dollar:
I think that the new land reform is basically positive. Over the next 15 years it makes economic sense for another 150-200 million people to move from the countryside to the cities because they will be much more productive in urban work. China could produce the same amount of food as it does now with far fewer workers. The land reform helps this transformation in two ways. First, to produce with less labor will require consolidation of land into larger farms and mechanization. The new land rules will permit this. Second, many families will want to permanently sever their links to the countryside. Under the new rules they can sell out and move to the city with some money to help set themselves up. There is a risk of a new class of poor landless laborers being created. The best solution to this is to continue to strengthen rural education and health so that everyone has good basic human capital. China has also developed an urban and rural minimum income support program that can be an effective safety net if it is properly funded. Emre:
Is China finally big enough for downturning world economy into a global recession?
Louis Kuijs:
We are often asked whether China can "save" the global economy from going to a recession. Our answer is "not really". China will likely outgrow most other parts of the world in 2009, and China’s growth will be a very substantial contribution to overall world growth in that year. However, China’s economy is—at about one-fourth of the US economy—too small to carry the global economy forward. Forecasts for 2009 are subject to a lot of uncertainty and risk, including the one for China. However, the projection that China will outgrow most other parts of the world in 2009 is in our view quite robust to these uncertainties and risks. Therefore, we think China’s growth will generate a net positive contribution to world growth. anil sahu:
when will the market again grow?
David Dollar:
Everyone recognizes that weaknesses in the regulation of complex financial instruments such as derivatives have contributed to an economic crisis that keeps accelerating. But I also like to emphasize that poor coordination of macro policies among the US, Europe, Japan, and China created underlying weaknesses. Without those underlying problems, I don't think that weak regulation by itself could cause such a crisis. That's why financial bailouts in the US, Europe, and Japan seem to have stabilized things to some extent, but yet we don't see much rebound of real economic activity. To really get the global market growing again at a healthy rate will take, first, coordinated stimulus in all the big economies. Second, following the stimulus, emerging markets such as China will have to play a greater role in global final demand. That means more private consumption in China and more government spending on recurrent items such as health and education. The US in turn will need to increase its savings and reduce its trade deficit. With well-coordinated policies, the worst of the global slowdown should be over by the middle of 2009, and the global economy should pick up as we move to 2010. Peter Bowie:
In the past year or so, the property market has turned down, or at least been flat, the SSE has dropped significantly, and more recently, unemployment has risen in manufacturing, and the PPI has dropped below 30. In addition, there is extensive coverage of the recessions in the US, Europe and Japan and the various serious financial systemic issues. Is it not reasonable to expect the appropriately frugal Chinese consumer is going to reduce spending and further impact growth in 2009?
David Dollar:
You are right that cautious Chinese households are likely to reduce the growth of their consumption spending in 2009. We have built this into our forecast - lower growth of private consumption than during the boom years. However, no one can predict for certain how much retrenchment there will be. China can still grow at 7.5% in our view, with healthy growth of household income. Hopefully the government's fiscal and monetary stimulus will boost consumer confidence and convince Chinese people not to pull back too much. Too much worrying could cause a self-fulfilling downward spiral. Patrick Campbell:
Considering the yuan weakened the most since 2005 overnight, what do you believe will be the government’s currency policy moving forward?
David Dollar:
Going forward I expect gradual appreciation or stability of the effective exchange rate (that is, the weighted average against the dollar, euro, yen, etc.). So, depending on what happens among the dollar, euro, and yen there could be movement either way in the dollar-yuan exchange rate. But it would be surprising to see any big depreciation of the yuan against the dollar for several reasons. China will still have a large trade surplus in 2009 so it is hard to see any argument for devaluation. Its trading partners are not likely to welcome any such move. In the next few years countries like the US have to reduce their trade deficits and save more; that means surplus countries like China will need to reduce their surpluses. Gradual appreciation to support that is the most likely move. Lei Zhang:
China has decreased its interest rate by 1.08%,which is the biggest decrease in 11 years. Does this signal means that the authority think that the marcoeconomy is even worse than 1997 Asian fiancial cris？ What's your opinion toward the interest decrease and its effect in stimulating the economy.whether the interset rate policy will make you adjust your prediction of next year's growth rate which is only 7.5%.
David Dollar:
Good point that the interest rate decline is the biggest in 11 years. I do think the government finds the current global situation more risky than the 1997 Asian crisis. In 1997 the crisis was largely confined to emerging markets and the US economy was still in good shape. What is different this time is that the crisis starts in the US and spreads to Europe and Japan. The coordinated downturn in these three big economies is unprecedented. So I think it is smart for China to respond quickly with fiscal and monetary stimulus. Our forecast of 7.5% in 2009 assumes that the government will respond to the changing conditions. So, we will not change our forecast based on this new interest rate move. That is the kind of good policy response that we built into our forecast. We were also careful to say in our quarterly that policy making for 2009 was not finished: meaning that the changing global situation may call for more stimulus from China. 12/10/2008 we're all subprime now!Credit quality continued to decline across the board, with delinquencies increasing for subprime, alt-A, and prime mortgages – and the greatest increase in percentage terms was in prime mortgages. 现在真的是大哥莫笑二哥，prime的违约高企也变成了subprime,大家都是subprime！学会一个单词re-default:After three months, nearly 36 percent of the borrowers had re-defaulted by being more than 30 days past due. After six months, the rate was nearly 53 percent, and after eight months, 58 percent. 大图在这里。 source:http://calculatedrisk.blogspot.com/2008/12/dugan-high-re-default-rates.html乱世英雄Jim Chanos was excited that afternoon. He had just read a report that China’s electric consumption had dropped 4 percent, despite official government statistics that the Chinese economy was growing at 8 percent. He relished the implications. “I think they’re making up the numbers!” he said. As Wall Street picks up the pieces of the broken financial system, Chanos is already one step ahead. He sees China as the next domino to fall in the global meltdown. In recent months, Chanos has loaded up short positions on the infrastructure companies that have rushed to build China’s new highways, bridges, and tunnels. Now he is waiting for their share prices to tank
source:The Catastrophe Capitalist Third Worst Bear Market On RecordThe S&P 500 finally had its first 20%+ rally in 408 days yesterday, which means we're currently in a bull market by the standard definition (20% rally preceded by a 20% decline). Over at Bespoke Premium, we released a B.I.G. Tips report yesterday that highlights what this means for the market going forward, but below we highlight historical bear markets for the S&P 500 since 1927. As shown, the bear market that ran from 10/9/07 to 11/20/08 is the third worst ever with a decline of 51.93%. The bears that ended in June of 1932 (-61.81%) and March of 1938 (-54.47%) are the only two that had bigger declines without a rally of 20%. The Volatility Bubble -- Average Daily Change Now Above 4%!A couple of weeks ago, we did a post showing that the 50-day average daily change of the S&P 500 was higher than at any other point in the index's history. After yesterday's close, another record was eclipsed when the average daily change moved above +/-4%! As shown below, this volatility blows away even the highest levels reached during the Great Depression. Up until the start of 2008, a daily move of 4% in a 50-day period was noteworthy. From 1945 through 2007, the S&P 500 had 49 one-day moves of 4% or more, which is an average of less than one per year. This year we've had 28! For a market as big as the United States to average a 4.02% daily change over a 50-day period is truly astounding. This is the type of volatility that we see in frontier and emerging markets -- not the biggest, most developed market in the world. The volatility bubble won't last forever, and being long it at this stage of the game is a very risky bet. Bill Gross Investment OutlookBill Gross最近展望09年认为投资的基本框架也已改变：My transgenerational stock market outlook is this: stocks are cheap when valued within the context of a financed-based economy once dominated by leverage, cheap financing, and even lower corporate tax rates. That world, however, is in our past not our future. More regulation, lower leverage, higher taxes, and a lack of entrepreneurial testosterone are what we must get used to – that and a government checkbook that allows for healing, but crowds the private sector into an awkward and less productive corner. 尤其他认为被人们广泛提及的低于历史水平的Q-ratio &P/E ratio可能已经失去指标意义，因为：the necessity to view current changes as not only non-cyclical, but non-secular. They are, in fact, likely to be transgenerational. We will not go back to what we have known and gotten used to. It’s like comparing Newton and Einstein: both were right but their rules governed entirely different domains. We are now morphing towards a world where the government fist is being substituted for the invisible hand, where regulation trumps Wild West capitalism, and where corporate profits are no longer a function of leverage, cheap financing and the rather mindless ability to make a deal with other people’s money.
比较新颖的观点是提到对于企业家精神和冒风险意识的伤害。这在“VC Ackerman: Firms That Didn’t Syndicate Are SOL”有更详细的阐释。Ackerman提到：This time, the Series Bs and Cs have collapsed. Basically, innovation is on sale 1.Dow 5,000 Redux by Bill Gross |
With global growth prospects for 2009 weaker than they have been in a long time, China's economy is braced for a significant further slowdown, says the World Bank's latest edition of the |
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