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3/31/2008 PIPE in China在看Private Equity的笔记, 有一个章节讲的是PIPE(Prof. Garmaise没有讲太多,但的确有讲过), 看着看着,突然觉得平时听到的那些新闻,外国公司入股中国上市公司,不就是PIPE吗?于是google了下面的新闻. 学以致用,真的没有发生在我身上.
不过有趣的是中国和美国的PIPE之间的明显区别. "From January 1, 2004 to May 1, 2004, there were 436 examples of PIPE deals involving common stock in U.S, according to PrivateRaise.com. These deals added up to $5.1 billion in investments. Most (298) of these deals were on companies with a market capitalization less than $100 million. So they were mostly micro-cap companies." 这样显著的原因可能是中国的PIPE才起步的原因吧. 不过,中国的PIPE要经过商务部和证监会的审批,可能也会避免出现美国90年代末的PIPE的滥用,特别是“death spiral convertibles” or “toxic convertibles.” 3/27/2008 Andy Grove's battleAfter reading Forbes, very sadly know that Andy Grove is battling Parkinson disease now. The article's title is "Andy Grove's last stand". Even now, Andy chooses more active approach than most of people do under such circumstances. 英雄的迟暮，虽然让人难过，但同时还在用一种特别的方式来鼓励人们。To me, he is a man of men. 3/25/2008 聯強杜書伍 全球布局不迷信數字「我們談的面向從全球布局來談，別談什麼數字之類的。」專訪一開始，聯強總裁杜書伍就這麼說。 站在制高點，杜書伍思考的面向是整個集團未來走向，媒體愛問，讀者愛看的數字目標，不是他的思考邏輯；再者，聯強的通路角色與企業文化，都強調「埋頭苦幹與態度低調」，對於數字與客戶，也都特別敏感。 專訪過程中，杜書伍字斟句酌，有時為思考一句話或一個詞，會停頓幾秒，就為了傳遞最適當的表達，顯示他的細心與謹慎，尤其談起新客戶或營收獲利，杜書伍的回答，能簡短就簡短，但是談起大陸市場的發展與布局，以及與台灣市場的文化差異，杜書伍則是暢所欲言。 「用台灣看世界，就像以管窺天。」杜書伍笑說，「當初到大陸市場，覺得不論什麼地方都很奇怪，這也奇怪，那也奇怪，後來知道，不是他們怪，是我們孤陋寡聞。」 杜書伍說，大陸太大，習慣於台灣市場與數字，到那裡很不習慣。「不要以為我們這裡拿的數字很了不起，再大的數字除以13億都是小數字，再小的數字，乘上13億，都是大數字。」在台灣資訊通路稱霸的聯強，到了中國大陸，有大陸型經濟的衝擊。 他說，「我在那裡都很謙卑」，「台灣很小，某種程度，不要夜郎自大」。 通路業為內需產業，「我們看的是人口數，不是人民平均所得。」中國大陸的人口與市場發展速度，成為聯強在台灣市場停滯不前之際，新的成長動能，也成為聯強踏進國際市場的支撐力量。 不過通路業是內需產業，必須徹底在地化，才能打入市場基層。雖然進入大陸市場長達十年，卻仍然讓杜書伍處處驚奇，「當地人為了求生存的創意，真的非常Rich（豐富）。」 杜書伍舉西部大城市西安為例。雖然地處西部，西安卻是全中國網咖最密集的城市，也是身為資訊通路的聯強，極為重視的城市。 「大陸網咖不只是網咖，還像是旅館。」杜書伍說，台灣網咖就是提供上網、飲料或是食物的空間。但是西安的網咖，還分等級，像是飛機一樣，有「商務艙」、「豪華經濟艙」。 他說，「人家比我們聰明，他們要生存嘛。」大陸網咖還分時段，比台灣的卡拉OK還細，這個時段多少錢，那個時段多少錢。 杜書伍在大陸看到創意，更看到機會。「當你在大陸這麼大的市場贏了，占一席之地，到世界各地，反而容易」。因為你的home base夠大，但是如果home base很小，這裡賺的錢，還不如到美國虧一個月，又怎麼走出去。 史丹佛偷偷教我的事by 劉威麟 from http://mag.udn.com/mag/newsstand/storypage.jsp?f_ART_ID=113974. 現代上班族表現得愈好，反而捨不得離開公司，路愈走愈窄，這個現象真的很弔詭。為什麼我們不願意給自己「另一條路走」？
這次回美國出差，特地見了一些很久沒碰到的老朋友，然後我驚訝地發現，彼此之間，竟有一些相同的境遇與夢想。我們之間的共同處，是都曾經念過這間叫做「史丹佛」的學校。
我們聊了很多事，也聊了很多「人」。話匣子常以這樣的方式打開，「你知道嗎？那個某某某學長，現在在做某某事……」我們發現，史丹佛畢業的人的職涯設計，真和其他學校的人有所不同。史丹佛的人或許待過麥肯錫，然後雷曼兄弟，然後高盛，但之後很有可能拋掉一些東西，自己開一間公司、做一個新事業，我到上海，你到美國，我們全世界四處跑。
簡而言之，「創業」在這個族群並不是一件奇怪的事。
其實大家都在創業 儘管最後真正全職出來「創業」的，嚴格計算下來，十個史丹佛畢業生中其實只有一、二位，但如果將「創業」這個動作廣義化，有些學長成為所謂的「二分之一族」，也就是白天上班，晚上做自己的副業；有些隱身成為知名部落客，白天上班，晚上成為可愛插畫背後的畫者。假如將這些都計入「創業」，全部加總起來，十個裡面可能就有九位都在「創業」了！目前檯面上知名的「史丹佛校友」，學學文創董事長徐莉玲、若水公司的作家王文華，Google台灣區業務總經理張成秀等……看看大家現在在做的事，某種程度上都可算是在「開創事業」中，他們自己走出了自己的一片天空。
我一直在想，為何史丹佛人「愛創業」？史丹佛教了我們和別人不一樣的是什麼？此趟美國行，我又見到台灣的「交大」也有類似的狀況，在矽谷與《拓荒》一書作者李喬琚碰面，她聽到有一批台灣網路創業家要到矽谷出差，馬上約了一個「交大校友晚會」要和大家聚聚。史丹佛偷偷教我們的事，答案已經漸漸明朗。
從史丹佛畢業的，拿到的不只是學位，而是這些「人」。這些校友建立了一套「通報系統」，口耳相傳，某某某創業了、辭工作了、去上海發展了……選擇了一條不一樣的路了。這就夠了！透過這個掛名「史丹佛」的「學長學姐通報系統」，史丹佛的畢業生都聽過特別多件「正在進行的創業故事」，我們從這些「小道消息」，得知了「前人」所走的路。
記得自從進史丹佛的第一天起，我就聽到「王文華」的名字，當時他還沒有這麼出名，我就看到他的文章以及他的努力。另外，我們看到成功創業家王耀庭，看到楊致遠，看到蔣顯斌，我們看到的不只是他們的現在，學校還流傳著他們在求學時代的故事，還有他們的努力過程，我們得以了解他們如何一開始到最後，走過如何怪誕的職涯路，很容易就觸動了「我們也應該給自己另一條路走」的念頭，丟掉現在的光環，退後、轉彎，尋求更大的突破！
「給自己另一條路走」，就是史丹佛偷偷教我的事！「某某某這樣做了，你還在等什麼！」 3/24/2008 None knows the marketTwo good articles.
a. "The evolution of an invetor" by Michael Lewis, the author of Liar's Poker, from Portfolio of Dec.2007.
b. "Market maker" from Forbes of Jan 2008, which is all about the market manipulations of a-share market as disclosed by an insider. As I told my friends yesterday, these articles just help me reinforce my convictions that none knows the market. There are only two things matter i.e.,a) you have correct thinking; b) you have an independent thinking. Those persons who come up with so many rationals for what happened to the market and who make those-seemed-reasonable predictions of market direction may be the worst person who can protect your asset value. To me, investment is all about protection rather than prediction. Unfortunately, most of people are happy to pay their fund manager or broker to make those predictions. So, it is your own fault to rush into the quick transactions based on those seemed-sound predictions and pray for God to pretect your asset worth. Anyway, at least EFT fund makes much more sense to me than those mutual funds which claims for the potential of beating the market, since I still belive EMH works most of time in the market. 3/21/2008 Mck: learning to love recessionold article from Mckinsey Quarterly back to June 2002. Basically the conclusion is drawn that the companies which spend the most money in the recenssion may have the highest likelihood to outperform the peers after the recession. 正所谓：反其道而行之，其果必善。让我们面带微笑来迎接新的衰退吧！ To see how recessions can be used to advantage, we studied nearly 1,000 mainly industrial US companies over an 18-year period (1982–99) that included the US recession of 1990 to 1991.1 We identified companies that either remained industry leaders (those that stayed in the top quartile of performance in their industries) or became successful challengers (those that moved up into the top quartile).2 We then investigated the attributes of successful companies, both during the recession and in healthier economic times. Successful challengers, we found, maintained a greater appetite for acquisitions during the recession than did their less successful former peers. In periods of growth, these challengers were M&A laggards—they made 63 percent fewer deals3 than their former peers did. But during the recession, while competitors brought their deal-making activity nearly to a halt, successful challengers dropped relatively few of their transaction plans, erasing the gap with the rest of their industries. The transactions were much larger, too, with an average deal size during the recession of $174 million. Successful challengers seem to have pursued transactions that offered greater opportunity to shape industries, and even in demanding economic conditions these companies mobilized the management time and talent needed to identify, execute, and integrate acquisitions.
Moreover, successful challengers, unlike their more conservative former peers, were not afraid to spend their cash reserves in a recession. In 1990, they lowered their reserves to a level 41 percent below4 that of their former peers, though before the recession, their excess cash level had been just 6 percent lower (Exhibit 1). Meanwhile, leaders that remained successful during the recession pursued a larger number of much smaller deals than did their less successful former peers. But the most dramatic, and least expected, response of the leaders to the recession was their approach to operating expenses (Exhibit 2). While most companies tightened their belts, successful leaders, trading lower short-term profitability for long-term gain, refocused rather than cut spending. Indeed, these successful leaders, perhaps reasoning that a soft market required greater effort or provided greater opportunity, actually spent significantly more on selling, general, and administrative (SG&A) costs5 than did companies that lost their market leadership. Yet in expansionary periods, successful leaders spent significantly less on SG&A than did their former peers. Furthermore, successful leaders, seeking to extend their position through innovation, more than doubled their already higher-than-average level of spending on R&D6 during the recession relative to their former peers.
Expenditures on advertising followed a similar pattern, with successful leaders spending more money (as a percentage of sales) than did their former peers during the recession and smaller amounts of money in periods of growth. Despite selective spending increases during the 1990–91 downturn, successful leaders, which maintain an employee-to-sales ratio 27 percent lower than that of their industries, were still far more efficient than their former peers.
The financial markets rewarded companies willing to pursue contrarian strategies during the downturn. By the end of the 1990–91 recession, successful challengers had market-to-book ratios that were 25 percent higher than those of the unsuccessful challengers (Exhibit 3). Successful leaders increased their market-to-book advantage over their former peers by more than 38 percent. Thus, when other companies simply battened down the hatches, seeing only risk during the recession, the more successful competitors found opportunity and pressed their advantages. As companies today look to the end of the present downturn, they should consider that managing risk doesn't mean avoiding it altogether. 3/20/2008 施永青：应让子女有得选择施永青，就是我们大马路上随处可见的《中原地产》的老板。(施永青，香港中原地产创始人之一，现任中原集团主席，统领中国内地、香港、澳门三地分公司一千余间，员工两万多名) 他的blog很有意思,很有见地。比如下面这一篇《应让子女有得选择》 有朋友不理解：为何我会把我在中原的股权捐给慈善基金，而不是留给我自己的子女。我其实是为子女着想才这样做的。
第一，我的子女不一定喜欢做生意，硬要他们做我的接班人，局限了他们的人生前程，对他们不公平。我自己就是走投无路才被迫创业的，如果我当年有更多的选择，我不一定选择从商。所以，我不觉得我应该代替子女去作这类事关重大的选择。 第二，如果我把我的事业一下子交给我的子女去负责，他们未必能承受得了。我自己是花了几十年，才把我的事业从小做到大，在过程中积累了不少经验，受了很多教训，才慢慢掌握足够的智慧去营运一个二万多人的机构。我的子女刚从学校出来，要他们担大旗，只会害苦他们，叫他们的人生充满挫败感。 虽然，公司本身已有一个不错的班底，可以辅助我的子女去推行他们的工作，但因循旧方式去经营必然无法为他们带来真正的满足感，所以第二代多数都想搞搞新意思。 然而，搞新意思的失败率是很高的，所以旧时中国的有钱人，宁愿子女吸鸦片烟，也不想子女去做新生意。因为吸鸦片烟，任你二十四小时不断地吸，花费也有限，但做新生意，可能是愈进取的，身家就败得愈快。 第三，若是他们真的做生意的话，最好还是让他们自己由头去创立。 做生意的成功感来自「无中生有」，由小到大。如果一开始就承继一个大企业，即使做出成绩，别人也会认为是靠父荫，日后反而成了思想包袱。很多事例显示：第二代接班人，不要奢谈更上一层楼，单是要守住原有的规模也并不容易。眼看着上一代剩下来的生意，在自己的手里变得愈来愈不象话，饱受业绩倒退的威胁，这绝对不是一种良好的感觉。 于我来说，我最大的责任是要为子女提供受教育的机会，如果他们有读书能力，而我却没有能力供他们升学，那么我才会感到遗憾。现在，他们基本上已有谋生的能力，他们应自己去充实自己的人生。人生本身是一场挣扎，要不断克服困难，改善自己的处境，才有成功感。如果父母甚么都为子女准备妥当，子女就不容易找到奋斗目标。因此，含着银匙出世，不一定是一种值得羡慕的处境。我现在所做的，就是为了避免子女陷入这种处境 3/19/2008 才知道最近在看书，才知道Benjamin Gramham最后是到了ucla教授金融，然后就google到了这个新闻：“Richard Roll Receives Graham and Dodd Award for Best Financial Analysts Journal Article”。那个时候还去上了Prof.Richard Roll的International Investment，那本讲义和案例就静静的躺在CD里面，再也没有看过，我已经不再记得那门课程教过我的任何一个financial concept，或许就像Benjamin Gramham在他的回忆录里面写到的那样：我的那些columbia University同学们在他们以后的日常工作中都好像有意忘记了那些学过的知识，也没有再去增加这方面新的知识。
现在，还能记得的是满头白发的Prof.Richard Roll，在有一次上课中兴致勃勃地教我们使用excel中的matrix功能，那门课程的学生不多，总共就16/17个学生。我和tomo是很少的一年级学生，所以我当时大概100%没有理解他的讲授。还有就是他的课的作业都是实际的案例，他很少在课堂上讲什么financial theory，只是给我们评点我们的案例作业。
其实，回过头来看，才明白自己曾经浪掷过多少宝贵的财富。是的，你怎么能要求一个花样年华的少年去真正听懂Sergei Rachmaninov？ |
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