他們堅持要「朝聖」。這天，被稱為「奧馬哈先知」（Oracle of Omaha）、美國股神巴菲特（Warren Buffett）所掌理的波克夏．海瑟威控股公司（Berkshire Hathaway）舉辦年度股東大會。這群巴菲特迷，無論如何都要擠進座位有限的會場，要從股神口中，抓出一絲未來選股、投資的端倪。

全球投資人都領教過巴菲特的選股功力。譬如他近來共動用五．七億美元，陸續購入三四八萬股韓國浦項鋼鐵的股票，市值已高達一一．五八億美元，成長幅度超過一倍。

事實上，當巴菲特考慮買一家公司的股票，他花很多時間分析，如同要合併一家公司般的檢視公司的主要業務，輔以他行之多年的價值投資法則。

「投資時，要把自己當成企業分析師，而不是市場分析師或總體經濟基分析師，更不是證券分析師，」巴菲特曾說。

美國著名基金經理人彼得．林區在《勝券在握》一書提到，「巴菲特強調成功投資的重要因素，取決於企業的實質價值，和一個合理划算的交易價格。他不在意最近或未來股市將會如何運作」。

從不投資自己不了解的企業

打開巴菲特投資的公司名單，橫跨美、亞洲，也像八爪章魚般從零售、能源到金融、保險等，包括去年收購以色列ISCAR金屬切割公司、浦項鋼鐵，在香港Ｈ股掛牌的中石油，可口可樂、美國運通、特易購、穆迪公司、WhiteMountains保險公司、富國銀行、寶鹼等。

名單中不見這些年熱門的高科技股。因為巴菲特從不投資自己不了解的企業，或者在他「競爭優勢圈」（Circle of Competence）外的企業。他所謂的競爭優勢圈，都是自己專精、樂於研究的產業。

這位七十六歲，今年三月榮登《Forbes》雜誌美國第二大富豪，至今依舊住在三十多年前用三萬多美元買下的房子，逢人就推薦自己最愛喝的櫻桃可樂，巴菲特掌握什麼投資心法？

在八月份的《美國新聞與世界報導》分析，他的投資心法正和他的生活原則一樣，「簡單專注」。

心法一 不做賠本生意

「投資的第一法則，就是不要賠錢，第二法則是不要忘記第一法則，」這是巴菲特主義（Buffettism）最經典的一句話。

巴菲特最大的成就，就是從一九六五年到二○○六年，歷經三個熊市，他掌理的波克夏只有在二○○一年跌價過，（但當年依舊榮登SNP500）。

心法二 不要陷入盈餘迷思

巴菲特判斷一家公司財務的重點，並不是一般投資人關注的每股盈餘（ＥＰＳ），而是「股東權益報酬率」（ＲＯＥ）。

巴菲特認為，ＥＰＳ並不能說明什麼，因為它無法反映股東過去投資了多少，然而股東們在一家公司投資愈多，公司盈餘應該要愈多。所以他選擇以ＲＯＥ衡量企業獲利能力，也就是每個股東能分到多少公司的毛利。譬如巴菲特持有的可口可樂公司的股票，這家公司的ＲＯＥ超過三○％、美國運通有三七％。

心法三 判斷未來發展性

巴菲特迷封他為「奧馬哈的先知」，不是沒有道理的。

他檢測一家公司的體質，是看好它未來二十五年的發展性。芝加哥Ariel資產管理公司主席羅傑斯（John Rogers），在八月份的《美國新聞與世界報導》中指出，「他常說，看事情要從車窗往前看，不是從後照鏡看」。

巴菲特精算企業實質價值（intrinsic value），還有這些企業能否以顯著的價值折扣購得。

像巴菲特今年買進兩家股票表現不佳的美國鐵路公司Burlington Northern和Union Pacific，都是投資人不看好的公司。但這兩家公司今年至今，股數分別增加了一八％和三四％。

心法四 專注有「護城河」的企業

預測未來有風險性，因此巴菲特總是喜歡選擇有寬廣「經濟護城河」（economic moat）的企業。他非常關注一家企業長期的競爭優勢，藉此保障他的預測。

這也說明為什麼一九九○年代，巴菲特拒絕投入科技股，因為當時看不到哪家公司有足夠寬廣的護城河，「這超出我所了解的層面，」當時巴菲特並非如外界所言，刻意忽略科技股，而是他認為科技技術汰舊換新的速度太快，很多公司創造的競爭優勢只有十八個月。

心法五 要下籌碼，就下大一點

大多數價值型投資人，天性比較保守。根據美國晨星公司（Morningstar）追蹤，平均這類基金經理人，將自己的籌碼分散在一四六檔不一樣的股票。但是，這不是巴菲特的做法，股神將自己六十二億美元的資金，集中投資在四十五家公司股票上。

事實上，巴菲特投注在前十檔股票的資金，佔他投資組合的九成。「不要動不動就揮棒，如果要揮，在你的圈裡揮，」他告誡過投資人。

根據晨星公司統計，持有五十檔以下股票的價值型股票基金，報酬率表現在過去三年到十五年的期間，比持有超過五十檔股票的基金來得好。當然，籌碼集中，風險自然高，投資人對自己的選擇在未來的表現，必須有極度的自信。

心法六 不要害怕等待

如果你試圖學巴菲特在股市大動作揮棒，你有很大的出局風險。

巴菲特的法則是，「不要輕易揮棒，要揮棒也不要打到壞球」。他曾經引述美國紅襪隊強棒威廉斯（Ted Williams）的話，「當個好打者，你必須選好球來打」。

遇到真正的好球前，巴菲特寧可緊握現金，也不輕易出手，「他比大多數的投資者都看得清楚，手上有大量現金，並不一定就會減損公司表現，現金是一種策略型資產，」紐澤西基金公司Fairholm Fund共同經理人波可維滋（Bruce Berkowitz）指出。

事實上，現金部位佔了波克夏投資配置中的一八％。這並不代表巴菲特不想投資獲取更大的獲利。他深信，「貪婪是好的」，但要有足夠的耐性鍛鍊貪婪，「你要在別人恐懼時展現貪婪，在別人展現貪婪時，你要恐懼」。

More than 70 years ago, two Columbia professors named Benjamin Graham and David L. Dodd came up with a simple investing idea that remains more influential than perhaps any other. In the wake of the stock market crash in 1929, they urged investors to focus on hard facts — like a company’s past earnings and the value of its assets — rather than trying to guess what the future would bring. A company with strong profits and a relatively low stock price was probably undervalued, they said.

Their classic 1934 textbook, “Security Analysis,” became the bible for what is now known as value investing. Warren E. Buffett took Mr. Graham’s course at Columbia Business School in the 1950s and, after working briefly for Mr. Graham’s investment firm, set out on his own to put the theories into practice. Mr. Buffett’s billions are just one part of the professors’ giant legacy.

Yet somehow, one of their big ideas about how to analyze stock prices has been almost entirely forgotten. The idea essentially reminds investors to focus on long-term trends and not to get caught up in the moment. Unfortunately, when you apply it to today’s stock market, you get even more nervous about what’s going on.

Most Wall Street analysts, of course, say there is nothing to be worried about, at least not beyond the mortgage market. In an effort to calm investors after the recent volatility, analysts have been arguing that stocks are not very expensive right now. The basis for this argument is the standard measure of the market: the price-to-earnings ratio.

It sounds like just the sort of thing the professors would have loved. In its most common form, the ratio is equal to a company’s stock price divided by its earnings per share over the last 12 months. You can skip the math, though, and simply remember that a P/E ratio tells you how much a stock costs relative to a company’s performance. The higher the ratio, the more expensive the stock is — and the stronger the argument that it won’t do very well going forward.

Right now, the stocks in the Standard & Poor’s 500-stock index have an average P/E ratio of about 16.5, which by historical standards is quite normal. Since World War II, the average P/E ratio has been 16.1. During the bubbles of the 1920s and the 1990s, on the other hand, the ratio shot above 40. The core of Wall Street’s reassuring message, then, is that even if the mortgage mess leads to a full-blown credit squeeze, the damage will not last long because stocks don’t have far to fall.

To Mr. Graham and Mr. Dodd, the P/E ratio was indeed a crucial measure, but they would have had a problem with the way that the number is calculated today. Besides advising investors to focus on the past, the two men also cautioned against putting too much emphasis on the recent past. They realized that a few months, or even a year, of financial information could be deeply misleading. It could say more about what the economy happened to be doing at any one moment than about a company’s long-term prospects.

So they argued that P/E ratios should not be based on only one year’s worth of earnings. It is much better, they wrote in “Security Analysis,” to look at profits for “not less than five years, preferably seven or ten years.”

This advice has been largely lost to history. For one thing, collecting a decade’s worth of earnings data can be time consuming. It also seems a little strange to look so far into the past when your goal is to predict future returns.

But at least two economists have remembered the advice. For years, John Y. Campbell and Robert J. Shiller have been calculating long-term P/E ratios. When they were invited to a make a presentation to Alan Greenspan in 1996, they used the statistic to argue that stocks were badly overvalued. A few days later, Mr. Greenspan touched off a brief worldwide sell-off by wondering aloud whether “irrational exuberance” was infecting the markets. In 2000, not long before the market began its real swoon, Mr. Shiller published a book that used Mr. Greenspan’s phrase as its title.

Today, the Graham-Dodd approach produces a very different picture from the one that Wall Street has been offering. Based on average profits over the last 10 years, the P/E ratio has been hovering around 27 recently. That’s higher than it has been at any other point over the last 130 years, save the great bubbles of the 1920s and the 1990s. The stock run-up of the 1990s was so big, in other words, that the market may still not have fully worked it off.

Now, this one statistic does not mean that a bear market is inevitable. But it does offer a good framework for thinking about stocks.

Over the last few years, corporate profits have soared. Economies around the world have been growing, new technologies have made companies more efficient and for a variety of reasons — globalization and automation chief among them — workers have not been able to demand big pay increases. In just three years, from 2003 to 2006, inflation-adjusted corporate profits jumped more than 30 percent, according to the Commerce Department. This profit boom has allowed standard, one-year P/E ratios to remain fairly low.

Going forward, one possibility is that the boom will continue. In this case, the Graham-Dodd P/E ratio doesn’t really matter. It is capturing a reality that no longer exists, and stocks could do well over the next few years.

The other possibility is that the boom will prove fleeting. Perhaps the recent productivity gains will peter out (as some measures suggest is already happening). Or perhaps the world’s major economies will slump in the next few years. If something along these lines happens, stocks may suddenly start to look very expensive.

In the long term, the stock market will almost certainly continue to be a good investment. But the next few years do seem to depend on a more rickety foundation than Wall Street’s soothing words suggest. Many investors are banking on the idea that the economy has entered a new era of rapid profit growth, and investments that depend on the words “new era” don’t usually do so well.

That makes for one more risk in a market that is relearning the meaning of the word.

James Tisch's Wise Value Investment Advice (LTR)

High On Loews from Forbes.com

Here's a fact: The speculators and hedge fund managers who run today's stock market need market volatility in order to make money.

They can't make enough money if the market stays flat or moves only a bit, so they like extreme and unexpected price movements. They especially like sudden, surprise movements down, when they can make money off stocks they borrow and sell -- or, as they say, "sell short."

Money Lust Satisfied

That's what's been happening the past couple of weeks. But it's not interesting to say that the speculators are whipping the market around to satisfy their money lust. So the speculators themselves make up reasons for why the market is fluctuating, flog those reasons to the media, and then profit if some other speculators believe the jive reasons and jump in the way the manipulators want them to.

Supposedly, the market is "correcting" because of worries about the housing slowdown, and also because of fears that the debt markets that support mergers and acquisitions is drying up.

These are interesting theories, and people who don't know a lot about the stock market or the economy might find them beguiling. What follows are a few truths that show how shallow these "reasons" for the stock market moves are.

Housing a Theory

Yes, the housing market has slowed from a spectacular bubble level to a simply pretty good level. Housing sales and starts are now about what they were in 2002, and no one thought we were in a housing depression then.

In any event, housing is only about 5 percent of the economy. If it falls by 15 percent, that would represent a fall-off of about .75 percent. That's not trivial, but it's also not the stuff of which recessions are made.

The fact is that there is no recession. The economy is suffering from a labor shortage, not a surplus of unemployment. The Fed is worried about excess demand, not slack demand.

Corporate profits set new records every day. Whatever's happening in residential sales and building is simply not slowing down the economy. Why should a Boeing or a Merck or a Pfizer have any reaction to housing at all? Because the speculators sell everything they can when nervousness sets in -- and for no other reason.

A Minor Major Mess

Subprime is a mess. But it's a small mess. Subprime mortgages account for roughly 20 percent of mortgages even in the most heavily exposed states. About 20 percent of them are delinquent in some way. That's 4 percent of mortgages.

Of these, maybe half, or 2 percent, will go into foreclosure. There will be roughly 50 percent recovery on sale of these. This is a loss of 1 percent in the mortgage market -- a sum the lenders have already made many times over because of the hefty fees on those deals. In the context of the size of the U.S. financial sector, it's nothing.

And why should a crisis in subprime drive down stocks in Mexico and Thailand? Again, because the speculators seek to create panic to make money by selling short, and they sell short everything.

There's simply no connection between subprime and developed or developing nations' stocks. This by itself shows the thin context of the selling wave late last month.

Money's Still Cheap

What about the supposed drying up of loans for mergers and acquisitions by private equity firms? Well, here's a good, simple test of just how valid that explanation is for stock market moves: The majority of private equity takeovers are financed with junk debt.

If there really were a major shortage of funds for these deals, the interest rate on the junk would skyrocket. Instead, while the rate has risen by about 150 basis points in the past month, the spread between junk and investment grade is now about 290 basis points, according to leading junk analyst Martin Fridson.

This is a lot lower than the year-end average of the spread from 2002 to 2006, and far below the almost 800 basis point spread during a true interest-rate crunch like the one after the tech meltdown in 2000-2002.

So that's phony, too. Interest rates have risen, but not anything like what they've done in real crises. And besides, the Dow fell by about 550 points the week before last, yet not one of the Dow stocks is involved as either acquiror or acquiree in a private equity deal.

In short, money is no longer virtually free the way it was for private equity deals in the past year. But it's not expensive by historical standards, either.

Spreading the Fear

In other words, it's all the speculators trying to panic us so their sell programs will make money. And they'll make money as long as they can spread their panic. When they can't do that any longer, they'll work the long side -- and make up reasons for that, too.

In the meantime, the economy is strong. Profits are great, and interest rates are low and will stay that way. Don't sell. With all the shrieking about the market, it only fell to what it was about five weeks ago -- and we didn't think we were poor then.

So let the speculators shout "fire." As of right now, they're not blowing anything but smoke.